Carey Land Act in Montana by Christensen, Bonnie S.
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1992 
Carey Land Act in Montana 
Bonnie S. Christensen 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Christensen, Bonnie S., "Carey Land Act in Montana" (1992). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers. 8511. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8511 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
Maureen and Mike 
MANSFIELD LIBRARY
Copying allowed as provided under provisions 
of the Fair Use Section of the U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW, 1976.
Any copying for commercial purposes 
or financM gain may be underàken only 
with the author’s written consent.
University ofMontana
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
THE CAREY LAND ACT IN MONTANA
By
Bonnie S. Christensen 
B.A., University of Montana, 1989
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
University of Montana 
1992
Approved by
T
i . A
Chairman, Board of Examiners
D ^ n ,  Graduate
 A / ̂  V
Date
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: EP39312
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI*
Oi«»artation PuWiaNmg
UMI EP39312
Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProjQ̂ st*
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Christensen, Bonnie S., M.A., June 1991 History
The Carey Land Act in Montana >99 pp.)
Director: H. Duane Hampton
In response to pressure from irrigation advocates, the 
U.S. Congress passed the Carey Land Act in 1894. Intended to promote the construction of irrigation projects in the 
western states, the Carey Act offered up to one million 
acres of federal land to each state that irrigated and 
settled those lands. In 1895, the Montana legislature 
approved a law to administer the Carey Act in the state. 
Through the Arid Land Grant Commission (1895-1903), and the 
Carey Land Act Board (1903-1965), Montana created three 
irrigation districts under the Carey Act and patented 92,000 
acres from the federal government.
The Billings Bench district near the city of Billings was 
the first successful Carey project in the state. In 1920, 
the construction company transferred title of the Billings 
Bench project to the water users on the over 13,000-acre 
district. The largest Carey project in the state, the 
Valier district, covered 70,000 acres. The other successful project was the Big Timber district, located in Sweet Grass 
County. Private construction companies built all three projects and made money by selling water rights on the land 
purchased by settlers.
Although it completed three successful projects, the Carey 
Land Act Board (CLAB) suffered from lack of state funding 
and found it difficult to attract investors for Carey 
projects. The lack of state stream-flow records to gauge 
water availability for the projects also created problems 
for the CLAB. Overestimation of available water supplies 
and underestimation of the high cost of constructing large 
irrigation projects led to the bankruptcies of several 
companies and made investors wary of Carey districts.
Records of the Arid Land Grant Commission and the Carey 
Land Act Board are located in the Montana State Archives at 
the Montana Historical Society in Helena. These records 
include letters, financial statements, project reports, 
minutes and engineering reports. Much of the research 
included in this paper is from these records.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I l l
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
1. "A SMALL OASIS IN A VAST SEMI-ARID PLAIN"......1
2. THE ARID LAND GRANT COMMISSION, 1895-1903... 11
3 . THE CAREY LAND ACT BOARD, 1903-1965......... 41
4. CONCLUSION.....................................  87
APPENDIX I : PROGRESS OF STATES UNDER THE
CAREY LAND ACT................  93
APPENDIX II: MONTANA CAREY DISTRICTS......  94
APPENDIX III: BILLINGS BENCH DISTRICT.....  95
APPENDIX IV: VALIER DISTRICT...............  96
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................  97
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 1
"a small oasis in a vast semi-arid plain"
The westward movement of settlers has characterized 
American history since the first Europeans landed in 
Virginia. Farmers, trappers, miners and adventurers moved 
west to find land, furs, gold and excitement. Individually, 
most were ordinary people who just wanted to find a better, 
or perhaps an easier, life. But, as a group, these 
pioneers, especially the farmers, took on a romantic aura 
for many Americans. They came to represent the best of 
America--they were virtuous, honest, hardworking, and 
carried the future of the nation on their sturdy backs. 
However far removed from reality, this Jeffersonian ideal of 
the yeoman farmer was eagerly adopted by reformers in the 
late 19th century who were searching for an antidote to the 
corruption and vice they found in American industrial 
society.
To many reformers of the Progressive Era, the continued 
creation of small farms equaled the preservation of American 
society. Americans "still believed that the family farm was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the foundation of a healthy economy and essential to the 
perpetuation of democratic institutions and civic 
responsibility.'" As Eastern cities became more crowded 
and crime ridden, reformers dreamt of moving the "surplus" 
population of the cities onto the wholesome land of the west 
where these people could tend the earth and live the simple, 
virtuous life of Thomas Jefferson's republican farmer. But, 
by the 1380s the extension of the agricultural frontier was 
beginning to slow as farmers ventured into what had once 
been called "The Great American Desert." Although cattle 
and sheep prospered in this region, farmers struggled. In a 
land where rainfall averaged less than 2 0 inches per year, 
most forms of agriculture could not survive without 
irrigation. Thus, for those who believed that the future of 
the United States depended on the continuation of the 
agricultural frontier into the semi-arid region west of the 
100th meridian, irrigation became an obvious necessity. 
Without irrigation, settlement of the western lands would 
stop; the mythical "safety valve" would close and the 
troubles of American cities would continue to escalate.
In addition to social reformers, the irrigation 
movement also attracted those who hoped to benefit 
materially from the Anglo settlement of the west. Unlike 
the Progressives, who wanted to increase arable land to cure
^Donald Pisani, "Reclamation and Social Engineering in 
the Progressive Era," Agricultural History 57 (January 1983), p. 46-48.
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the social ills of the nation, boosters in the western 
states and territories wanted to construct irrigation 
projects to promote stable farms that would strengthen their 
local economies. A successful irrigation project near a 
town could revitalize a community by bringing in new people 
and more money. Irrigated farmland also created a more 
substantial tax base for the state. Whether motivated by 
the vision of a utopia of small farmers or by greed, many 
western businessmen, politicians and farmers supported the 
development of irrigation systems in the region:
Individual farmers, private businesses and community 
groups constructed the first irrigation systems in the west. 
But, by the 1880s, irrigationists like William E. Smythe, 
publisher of Irrigation Acre, and Elwood Meade, State 
Engineer of Wyoming, realized that private capital was not 
establishing enough reclamation projects. Although private 
companies did build some canal systems in the hopes of 
achieving large returns, most of these projects were not 
successful. The water in the projects was expensive, water 
users and water suppliers quarreled over prices, and many 
companies failed because they could not settle their lands 
quickly enough. According to historian Richard White, by 
1900 "90 percent of the private canal companies [were] in 
financial distress. Most sold out, often on credit, to 
their water users. Such financial failures did not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
encourage further private investment in irrigation 
systems .
In an attempt to help farmers, and in response to 
pressure from reformers and western leaders, Congress passed 
the Desert Land Act in 1877, This new act gave settlers the 
right to claim up to 640 acres of arid lands, which they 
could purchase for one dollar an acre after three years if 
they "improved" a portion of the land by conducting water to 
it. Designed to attract settlers, this law was more 
beneficial to ranchers who exploited its vague wording to 
add more land to their holdings.’ Westerners who attempted 
to lure small farmers to their states and territories feared 
that if ranchers continued to expand their holdings, these 
states would become little more than cattle baronies without 
the stable, prosperous communities that yeoman farmers would 
create. Richard Roeder, in his study of the Progressive Era 
in Montana, found this desire to make farming more dominant 
expressed in Montana as well as in other states.
"Montanans," he argued, "believed that the farm community 
would free them from a dependence upon grazing as well as 
mining... There existed a feeling that land was too valuable 
to use five acres to feed a cow and that a boundless and
’Richard White, "It's Your Mis fortune and None of Mv 
Own": A History of the American West. {Norman and London:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 403.
’Paul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968),p . 638-641.
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more stable prosperity would prevail when all arable and 
irrigable land was put into small farms.
Representatives from the western states recognized that 
they needed more federal assistance to build the bigger 
irrigation projects necessary to water the vast acres of 
land not adjacent to a water source. As the west 
experienced a series of droughts in the 1880s, irrigation 
advocates began to call for regional conferences to decide 
how to obtain the needed irrigation works. In 1891 the 
First Irrigation Congress met in Salt Lake City to discuss a 
strategy for pursuing this goal. At the conference, 
delegates from states and territories throughout the west 
adopted a resolution calling on the federal government to 
cede land to the states to finance irrigation.̂ Federal 
cession would provide an incentive to develop irrigation 
projects because it could mean a great increase in the 
state's taxable land. Cession was a half-way measure 
between direct federal aid, which many strongly opposed, and 
strictly private construction of irrigation systems.
Like other states and territories in the arid west, 
Montana had its own boosters and promoters who supported 
irrigation as a way to increase the population and 
prosperity of the state. According to Richard Roeder,
"Richard Brown Roeder, "Montana in the Early Years of 
the Progressive Period," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1971. p. 86.
^Gates, p. 648.
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"There was common agreement that federal aid was essential 
to bringing about a greater future because private capital 
was not equal to the task of building the necessary canals 
and reservoirs to utilize the state's waters."” Montanan 
Robert Sutherlin embraced this attitude toward irrigation. 
Editor of The Rocky Mountain Husbandman from 1875 to 1926, 
Sutherlin, like others of this time, firmly believed in the 
virtue of the yeoman farmer. He argued that, because of the 
harsh climate, in order for farmers to succeed in Montana, 
they needed the security of irrigation.' But large 
irrigation projects were expensive. Most of the land that 
could be cheaply irrigated in the state had already been 
filed on by 1882.’ Many investors who might have been 
willing to gamble on irrigation projects believed they could 
make more money by simply grazing cattle and sheep upon the 
land.® Large irrigation projects were beyond the scope of 
small farmers and private corporations, so Sutherlin, like 
other westerners, looked to the federal government for 
aid/"
’Roeder, p. 73.
’Frank R. Grant, "Embattled Voice for the Montana 
Farmers: Robert Sutherlin's Rocky Mountain Husbandman,"
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Montana, p 169 .
’Grant, p. 173.
’Grant, p. 17 5 
'"Grant, p. 177
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In response to pressure from irrigation supporters, the 
U.S. Congress passed the "Carey Land Act" on 18 August 1894. 
Under the Carey Act, which was named for Senator Joseph M. 
Carey of Wyoming who introduced the bill, the federal 
government agreed to grant up to one million acres of public 
land to each western state if the state would reclaim and 
settle that land within ten years. An essential part of the 
legislation involved settlement ; the act specified that the 
states could sell Carey land in parcels no larger than 160 
acres. Congress expressly sought to benefit farmers, not 
large ranchers or land speculators.
To apply for Carey land, the state first submitted maps 
and plans to show how reclamation would proceed on the 
specified area. If the federal government approved the 
plans, it then "segregated" the land and permitted the state 
to begin its reclamation work. After the state adequately 
"reclaimed" and settled the area, the federal government 
then granted the state a "patent" for the land, and 
officially transferred ownership to the state, which then 
sold the land to settlers. In later amendments to the Carey 
Act in 1896 and 1901, Congress allowed the Secretary of the 
Interior to issue patents when an "ample supply of water is 
actually furnished upon the land...without regard to 
settlement or cultivation," and extended the original 10- 
year deadline for reclamation; the state was given 10 years 
from the time of segregation approval to complete irrigation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and reclamation, but the Secretary of the Interior could 
extend this deadline at “his discretion" . The state could 
build the irrigation system itself or contract with a 
construction company to do the work.
Many states did not take greater advantage of the Carey 
Act because the act did not provide any funds for the state. 
The Carey Act was really government-sponsored private 
reclamation, and, "Private capital had taken up and improved 
the most likely projects which did not require too large an 
investment and promised quick return in water rents or in 
accelerating land p r i c e s . T h e  donation of federal land 
helped defray the cost of building Carey projects, but the 
act did not help states or companies with the money needed 
to start projects and maintain them until they drew in 
settlers who would pay for the systems. Like other states, 
Montana found it difficult to attract investors willing to 
finance the construction of irrigation projects under the 
Carey Act since the act offered nothing in funding and no 
guarantee for the private investment.
Because most states could not take full advantage of 
the Carey Act due to the financial inadequacies of the 
legislation, irrigation supporters demanded more government
“State of Montana, Rules and Regulations of the Carey 
Land Act Board of the State of Montana. (Helena: State
Publishing Company, 1909), p. 3-5. Robbins, Roy M ., Our 
Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1936. (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1962), p. 328-329.
“Gates, p. 651.
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aid. Under the Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902, Congress 
provided the initial funds to build dams and canals; 
settlers on the reclamation projects eventually repaid the 
building expenses. Since the government did not have to 
satisfy investors, it did not have to worry about immediate 
returns on the investment of constructing large projects.
The Congress had augmented the Carey Land Act with new and 
better legislation that would create hundreds of irrigation 
projects throughout the west.
States continued to take advantage of the Carey Act, 
however, well after it was "replaced" by the Newlands act.
In Montana, the Carey Land Act Board, created by the state 
legislature to administer the act, continued to function 
until 1965. Although it sometimes took several decades for 
the Montana board to complete its irrigation systems, three 
projects were successful and provided irrigated land for 
hundreds of farmers. The Carey Land Act projects were not 
as large as the federal projects in the state, but they did 
demonstrate that private capital under state supervision 
could construct substantial irrigation works. Although the 
Carey Land Act never fulfilled the grand dreams of the 19th 
century irrigationists, it did satisfy some of these 
promoters and reformers.
When Sutherlin, the ardent irrigation supporter, 
visited Montana's Valier project in 1917, he discovered, as 
his biographer wrote, in that "embryonic irrigation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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community the symbol of his life's work. 'To the man who 
has devoted his life to the securing of water on the land in 
his dear loved Montana home...this great system is an 
indescribable joy,' he exclaimed. His hopes were affirmed 
by a small oasis in a vast semi -arid plain.
The "oasis" that so pleased Sutherlin was an irrigation 
project started and completed under the Carey Land Act of 
1894 .
^Grant, p. 421-22.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 2
The Arid Land Grant Commission, 1895-1903
Montana leaders eagerly accepted the chance to create 
new irrigation systems and bring more lands onto the state 
taxrolls; they saw the Carey Act as a way to increase the 
population and wealth of the state. Six months after 
Congress passed the Carey Act, the Montana legislature 
approved a law creating the Arid Land Grant Commission 
(ALGO to administer the act within Montana.
The Commission's duties included approving land for 
cession requests and supervising irrigation projects on 
those lands. Since the legislators did not want to commit 
state funds for building vast irrigation systems, the state 
law provided that the Commission would pay the cost of 
reclaiming Carey lands "by the issuance of warrants to the 
person or persons, corporation or corporations undertaking 
such work, for the full amount of said contract price." 
These warrants, or bonds, bore a six percent interest and 
constituted a lien, or first mortgage, on the land, water
11
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rights, and improvements.' The Commission would then figure 
the value of each parcel of Carey land with water right to 
be "the equitable proportion it shall bear to the total cost 
of reclamation of [the] district," plus twenty percent of 
that value added to the total. The ALGC was to place the 
extra twenty percent into a state fund to help pay for the 
construction of future Carey projects. The six percent 
interest accrued from the date the Commission issued the 
bonds and was added to the price of the land and appurtenant 
water rights. Contractors could only receive payment for 
the bonds when settlers purchased the reclaimed land in that 
irrigation district.̂ The state would charge settlers a 
minimal price for the land itself; the higher charge was for 
the inseparable water right.
Under this law, the Commission was responsible for 
issuing the bonds and warrants that would be used to pay for 
the irrigation projects. But this system created an awkward 
and delayed form of payment that caused problems for the
'State officials used the words "bond" and "warrant" 
interchangeably to mean the shares sold in an irrigation 
project. Officials used the more precise meaning of 
"warrant" to refer to promissory notes given to merchants or 
other individuals (including ALGC members) as payment for 
goods or services; individuals could redeem these warrants 
after the Commission sold the land in the district through 
which the warrants were issued.
^State of Montana, Irrigation Law of the State of 
Montana: The Carev Act. Report of Arid Land Grant
Commission and Recommendations of Governor Smith Regarding 
Irrigation. (Helena: State Publishing Company, 1897), p. 8-
10 .
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ALGC from the beginning. The Commission could not guarantee 
payment of the bonds and investors were reluctant to finance 
such risky projects. Poor economic conditions created by 
the Panic of 1893 increased the problems the Commissioners 
faced in trying to interest investors in Montana Carey 
projects.
If it could not sell its bonds, the Commission had to 
rely on the small yearly allowance provided by the state.
As a later report on the Arid Land Grant Commission 
admitted, "the small appropriation set aside for this 
purpose [reclamation and settlement], namely one thousand 
($1,000.00) dollars per year, so handicapped the commission 
as to make it impracticable to proceed upon or even to 
initiate so gigantic an u n d e r t a k i n g . R e l u c t a n t  to create 
new debts for the state, the legislature refused to provide 
for anything beyond nominal expenses to aid in the 
development of Carey projects and the settlement of Carey 
lands. Even before the members of the Commission began 
their duties, they were severely handicapped by the State's 
Carey legislation.
Governor John E. Rickards appointed the first members 
of the ALGC in 1895. In his Governor's Address earlier that 
year, Rickards had impressed upon the people of Montana his 
belief that the state needed to encourage federal aid for
R̂ules and Regulations of the Carev Land Act Board of 
the State of Montana. 1909, p. 6.
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reclamation. "Private capital," he stated, "is not equal to 
the burden of reclaiming such vast tracts, I am firmly 
convinced that it is the duty of the general government to 
aid in adapting the arid belt to the purposes of 
civilization, and that appropriations for this purpose 
should be made." Rickards commended the Congress for 
passing the Carey Act, calling it "The most practicable way 
of dealing with the irrigation question at the present 
time. In his attempt to facilitate the administration of 
the Carey act in Montana, to maintain the integrity of the 
Commission and to remove any suspicions of favoritism in 
choosing Carey Land Act districts, Rickards appointed 
commissioners who had no connections to irrigation 
enterprises.̂
Each of the five Commissioners served a six-year term, 
and the law maintained that the board would be "non­
partisan, " so "not more than three members shall be 
appointed from one political party." As compensation, each 
Commissioner received a per-diem payment of six dollars and 
traveling expenses for official duties. The Commissioners 
would receive these payments in warrants drawn from the 
state Carey Fund, also created by the law.
"State of Montana, Message of Governor John E. Rickards 
to the Fourth Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana, 
(Helena: State Publishing Company, 1895), p. 19.
^Leslie M. Heathcote, "The Montana Arid Land Grant 
Commission, 1895-1903." Agricultural History 38 (April 
1964), p. 1-2.
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These Commissioners held their first meeting on 9 April 
1895 and unanimously elected E.W, Beatty as chairman. At 
this meeting the Commissioners voted to form a committee of 
three members to locate lands for Carey projects in the 
state and to "temporarily employ competent engineers" to 
examine these areas since Montana did not yet have a state 
engineer. Due to the limited operating budget, the 
Commissioners resolved to "practice the strictest economy in 
the discharge of their duties," and formed a committee "to 
devise some way to raise ready money to carry on the 
preliminary work of the commission." Finally, the 
Commissioners resolved that "until the Board shall have made 
a careful examination of the lands susceptible of irrigation 
in the State, no contract or agreement for reclamation shall 
be entered into."* This provision would mean little in the 
future when the ALGC would be so desperate for outside 
investors that it would accept almost any project as long as 
someone was willing to fund it.
As early as 4 June 1895, the Commission began looking 
for "parties in the East" to back its Land Grant warrants.’ 
Chairman Beattie expressed optimism about finding investors; 
he claimed that the bonds would make a good investment
*Arid Land Grant Commission (ALGC) Minutes, 9 April 
1895. Montana Historical Society (MHS), Record Series (RS) 
31, Records of the Arid Land Grant Commission, 1895-1903, Box 2, Folder 26.
"E.W. Beattie to J.T. Armington, 4 June 1895. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
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because, "People who settle upon these reclaimed lands will 
succeed and will make their payments promptly; and we will 
see to it that we get good people with enough means to make 
a good start."®
Optimism notwithstanding, in his communications with 
the Commissioner of Arid Lands in Washington State, Beattie 
admitted that the ALGC was "seriously crippled" by having so 
little funding. "We are doing some preliminary surveying at 
private expense," he noted, "but at best it will be 
unsatisfactory."® In August Beattie complained to F.H.
Newell of the U.S. Geological Survey that the ALGC was 
“making very slow progress in our work because of the fact 
that it's impossible thus far to find people who will cash 
our warrants .
The Commissioners hoped that some of the problems with 
the bonds would be solved after the 1896 court decision of 
State V. Wright. In this case the Supreme Court of Montana
®E.W. Beattie to Hugh L. Cooper, New York City, 8 July 
1895. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
®E.W. Beattie to L.S. Howlett, Commissioner of Arid 
Lands, North Yakima, Washington, 27 July 1895. MHS, RS 31, 
Box 1, Folder 30. Beattie and Howlett exchanged 
correspondence about the progress each state was making in 
taking advantage of the Carey Act. The correspondence began 
in July of 1895 when Howlett wrote to Beattie requesting 
information on the Montana Carey legislation. In spite of 
this effort by Howlett, the state of Washington never
segregated any Carey land. Mikel H. Williams, The History
of Development and Current Status of the Carev Act in Idaho,
(Idaho Department of Reclamation, 1970), p. 13.
®̂E.W. Beattie to F.H. Newell, U.S. Geological Survey, 
Washington D.C., 8 August 1895. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
decided that the law creating the ALGC "was a valid 
legislative act," and declared that the Commission's 
warrants were legal. The Court held, however, that these 
bonds and warrants did "not create a claim against the 
s t a t e . A l t h o u g h  constitutional, the ALGC bonds remained 
a risky proposition because the state refused to bear any 
responsibility for guaranteeing payment on them.
Beatty and his colleagues were not given further time 
to work on the problem of luring capitalists into the state. 
On 2 April 1897 Robert B, Smith, the newly elected governor, 
requested the resignation of all the board members for 
political reasons. The Commission resigned en masse.
Unlike his predecessor. Smith appointed several 
members who had direct interests in irrigation to the new 
commission.” The most prestigious member of the new 
Commission was former Governor of Montana, Joseph K. Toole, 
whose interest in irrigation dated back at least to his 
tenure in that office. In his Governor's message for 1891, 
Toole had predicted the advent of federal aid for 
irrigation, and had also warned the state to guard "against 
the demands of those who, eager to monopolize our lands, 
will doubtless be on hand to urge a hasty and inconsiderate
”State V. Wright, 1896. Copy of decision in MHS, RS 31-2-33 .
”ALGC Minutes. 2 April 1897. MHS, RS 31, Volume 2. 
“Heathcote, p. 3-4.
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disposition thereof.'"" Toole's wary approach to 
reclamation projects put him at odds with other Commission 
members who favored a more aggressive irrigation program in 
Montana; but, perhaps out of respect for his political 
experience and reputation, these men unanimously elected 
Toole as chairman at the first meeting."
In one of the initial meetings, the Board also 
authorized Donald Bradford, a Helena Democrat whose 
irrigation interests included the Dearborn Canal, to make 
"State Desert Land Selections", to draw up and Sign 
contracts, and to act as agent to select and segregate Carey 
lands." Having one person responsible for these duties 
meant that the entire commission did not have to meet to 
approve land selections; it also meant that Bradford was 
entrusted with a great deal of personal power to select 
sites for Carey projects. In addition to Toole and 
Bradford, the new governor appointed Thomas Marshall from 
Missoula and C.O. Reed from Helena to the Commission. The 
fifth appointee, Armistead H. Mitchell of Deerlodge, died in
"State of Montana, Message of Governor Joseph K. Toole 
to the Second Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana. 
January 5. 1891. p. 16.
"ALGC Minutes, 8 April 1897
"Ibid, 5 May 1897.
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1898 and Smith replaced him with David A. Cory, a 
businessman from Helena.*'
Since all of the Commissioners were from either 
Helena or southwestern Montana, people in other areas of the 
state feared that their counties might be left out of a 
possible Carey land boom. The Great Falls Tribune reminded 
the commission that, "It should not be forgotten...that 
northern Montana possesses some of the very best lands in 
the state for irrigation purposes." Since northern Montana 
had no representatives on the ALGC, the Tribune invited the 
Commission members to investigate the irrigation 
possibilities in that area, and cautioned it not to 
concentrate solely on the southern part of the state.” The 
Commission failed to heed this advice; the four projects 
begun by the ALGC between 1897 and 1903 were all in the 
southern part of the state or in Lewis and Clark County (the 
county in which Helena is located).
The Commission began work on developing projects in 
1897 with the selection of over 10,000 acres in the Billings 
"Bench" area northeast of the city of Billings as the first 
Carey district in Montana.” Although the Commissioners
”Heathcote, p. 3-4.
”Great Falls Tribune, 27 May 1898, p. 2.
”Ibid. “Benchlands" consist of a "continuous, broad, 
and nearly level high prairie,...which continues to fall 
slowly in the same direction." In 1889, engineer H.M. 
Wilson asserted that benchlands, such as those around
(continued...)
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believed that they could successfully irrigate the Billings 
land, they encountered problems floating the Billings bonds 
because of the vast amount of railroad land included in that 
district.’’ Investors worried about the legalities of using 
the Carey Act to construct an irrigation system that would 
include both federal and private lands. Even after the 
Commissioners sent a test case before the Montana Supreme 
Court that ruled that Carey Districts could incorporate 
private lands, they continued to have problems convincing 
investors to back the project.Finally, in February 1898,
^(...continued)
Billings, were ideally suited to irrigation because of the
low altitude and rich, deep soil. Wilson, H.M. "The
Irrigation Problem in Montana." The National Geographic 
Magazine. Vol. II, No. 2 (1889 Reprint), p. 216-17.
°̂The land in the Billings Bench District included a
little over 10,000 acres of government land and 15,000 acres 
belonging to the Northern Pacific Railroad. The sections in 
the district alternated between federal and railroad land 
due to the federal government's policy of granting to 
railroads alternate sections of land on either side of the 
railroads' tracks. The government donated this land to encourage the construction of railroads across the American 
west. The ALGC segregated only the federal lands, but, 
since any canal system would have to cross railroad land to 
reach Carey land, investors questioned the integrity of the 
district.
^̂State of Montana v. Arid Land Grant Commission was a 
friendly suit initiated by the Commission to establish a 
ruling about the ability of the Commission to create Carey 
Districts that included privately held lands. In its 
decision, the Supreme Court of Montana decided that the 
Commission should be able to establish such districts. In 
the opinion of the court, the ALGC's purpose was to enter 
into contracts for the "benefit of the state" and it was 
"evident that the legislative assembly intended to give, and 
did give, extensive powers to the commission." Since almost 
any district within the state would include lands claimed by
(continued...)
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the Commission awarded a contract to build the Billings 
Project (District No. 1) to the Reece Brothers of Billings, 
the sole bidders on the district.”
When the Commission failed to begin construction on the 
Billings project by 1900, settlers and businesspeople in 
that area began to pressure the commission to start work in 
the district. Bradford responded to this pressure by 
explaining that the "enterprise is of such magnitude that it 
requires a large amount of money, and for this reason it is 
very hard to sell our bonds." He hinted very broadly to 
these community leaders that he hoped that local capital 
might help pay some of the construction costs. Although 
local leaders refused to back the struggling project 
financially, they did form an organization, the Committee of 
Billings Club, to represent the irrigation interests in the 
area. This group advised the Commission that since the ALGC 
had proved unable to reclaim the Billings District, it 
should return the land to the U.S. Government, which could
. ..continued)
railroads and other corporations or individuals, the court 
concluded that prohibiting the state from segregating the 
land "would be to establish a rule that would be detrimental 
in the highest degree to the interest and welfare of the 
state." State of Montana v. Arid Land Grant Commission, 
February 1898. Copy of decision in MHS, RS 31-2-33.
^^ALGC Minutes. 21 February 1898.
^Donald Bradford to E.L. Boardman, Billings, 22 May 
1899. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
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then open it to general settlement. Private enterprise, the 
club argued, could then complete the project.'"
Replying for the ALGC, a pessimistic Thomas Marshall 
concluded that the ALGC had "given up hopes of being able to 
successfully promote the project" although it had "made 
strenuous efforts in this behalf." Either the project was 
"too large or not sufficiently inviting for capital to take 
the matter up."“ By the end of 1902 the Billings project 
seemed permanently stalled, and the ALGC appeared ready to 
relinquish the district.
Although it had made no progress on the Billings 
project, the ALGC continued to search for other lands to 
irrigate in the state under the Carey Act. Difficulties 
within the Commission arose from this pursuit, however, when 
at the 14 October 1897 meeting, with Toole absent, Bradford 
introduced a resolution to build a canal near Big Timber in 
Sweet Grass County. The Commission unanimously agreed to 
this proposal.^* On 4 November Toole resigned chairmanship 
of the Board to protest the Commission's decision to accept 
the Big Timber project.^’ Toole's move may have been
^"Committee of Billings Club to ALGC, 12 July 1901.
MHS, RS 31-1-30.
^^Thomas Marshall to P.B. Moss, Chairman of the 
Commercial Committee, Billings Club, 19 July 1901. MHS, RS 
31-1-39.
^®ALGC Minutes. 28 October 1897 .
'"Ibid, 4 November 1897.
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influenced by his desire to devote more time to his 
preparations to campaign for another term as governor of 
Montana, but it also reflected his cautious approach to 
reclamation. Toole continually argued, both as a 
Commissioner and later as Governor, that the ALGC should 
proceed slowly in its efforts to initiate new projects. He 
believed that completing a few good projects would be more 
beneficial to the state than starting, and not completing, 
many poorly planned irrigation systems. After resigning as 
chairman, Toole remained on the Commission until September 
of 1899. Although he left with kind words, Toole knew of 
the failures of the ALGC, and after his election as governor 
he worked to abolish the board.
The Commission elected Thomas Marshall to replace Toole 
as chairman. Later that month the Commission promoted 
Bradford to Vice-chairman. Because Marshall lived in 
Missoula, much of the day-to-day work of the Commission fell 
to Bradford and later to David Cory, whom the Commissioners 
elected secretary in April of 1899.
In spite of Toole's resignation as chairman, the ALGC 
members decided to continue efforts toward reclaiming over 
50,000 acres in the Big Timber district (District No. 2), 
but work proceeded very slowly since problems with the
^®Ibid, 2 September 1899. 
"®Ibid, 4 November 1897.
30Ibid, 19 November 1897.
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weather and delays from lack of supplies hindered 
progress. The board also had difficulties convincing
Andrew Wormser, whose Holland Irrigation Canal Company had
first expressed interest in the area, to offer a formal bid 
to reclaim District No. 2. The board informed Wormser that 
it would accept bids first in June, then September and 
finally in November of 1898; Wormser forgot to bid the first
two times, and, since the board received no other bids for
the district, it had to keep requesting more bids and 
reminding Wormser to file a bid. Finally in November the 
Board awarded the contract to Wormser at $12.50 per acre, 
the highest cost allowed by law.
Trouble hit the Big Timber project in 1900 when the 
principal backer of the District No. 2 bonds suddenly 
died.” Although the ALGC had already extended Wormser's 
starting date for construction, and had stipulated that it 
would not "consider any further request of this kind, 
pressure from Cory convinced the Commissioners to extend the 
commencement date to 1 April 1901 because Wormser was 
experiencing difficulties in locating a new backer for the
”Donald Bradford to W.S. Fortiner, 22 December 1897 
MRS, RS 31-1-1.
”ALGC Minutes, 15 November 1898. 
"Ibid, 9 May 1900.
34Ibid, 1 July, 1900.
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enterprise.'® The Commission later extended this date to 1 
July 1901^® and then again to 1 August 1901. Such an 
extension of deadlines would become a standard feature of 
the state's actions in Carey districts. Project financiers 
and state leaders continually underestimated the amount of 
time and money required to reclaim arid land. As officials 
tried to tighten their control over the projects, they found 
themselves faced with a decision either to accept delays and 
extensions or to relinquish the districts.
In the case of the Big Timber project, the ALGC agreed 
to extend deadlines, but demanded in turn that Wormser sell 
ownership of the canal and water rights to the Commission 
for $100,000 in District No. 2 bonds.®® The Commissioners 
hoped that the transfer of ownership would give the state 
more control over the project, and also give Wormser an 
added incentive to complete the canal system: if the
Holland Irrigation Company failed to reclaim and settle the 
land, the $100,000 in bonds would be worthless. By the end
®®Ibid, 1 November 1900 . 
®®Ibid, 27 March 1901,
37D.A. Cory to C.O. Reed, 14 July 1901, MHS, RS 31-1-
30 ,
®®ALGC report to Governor Joseph K. Toole, 22 January 
1902. MHS, Manuscript Collection (MC) 35, Montana 
Governor's Papers, Agency and Special Subject Files: Arid
Land Grant Commission, State Engineer, Carey Land Act Board, 
Box 175, Folder 12,
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of 1902, the Big Timber project, like the Billings district, 
remained little more than a hope.
Despite its failures on these two projects, the 
Commission developed an interest in starting a new 
irrigation project on the Clark Fork River near the town of 
Bridger in early 1899. The Bridger irrigation project 
(District No. 3) began as an optimistic attempt to have 
settlers build the canal system themselves; the contracting 
company would pay them in warrants which would be "received 
in payment for water rights and for supplies." The 
Commission restricted participants to those settlers who 
possessed "a team and scraper" and could support themselves 
during the period of construction. The first year promised 
to be difficult, but, as Bradford assured an inquirer from 
Wisconsin, Bridger farmers would be able to put in a crop 
within a year.’* Bradford boasted to a potential investor 
that the Bridger project was "the first instance in the 
histoz-y of the country where a State has undertaken to put 
settlers upon the land and give them employment, so that 
they could be supported during the first year or two of 
residence on the land." Bradford equated the terms of 
payment as actually being a seven percent loan on the water 
rights payment
’*Donald Bradford to Frank Vanderob of Wisconsin, 8 May 
1899. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
““Donald Bradford to J.E. Forrest of Chicago, 3 June 1899. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
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Unfortunately for the Commission and for the settlers 
who had come to Bridger expecting to begin work on a canal 
system, the Commissioners did not have a financial backer 
for District No. 3. Bradford and the other Commissioners 
had proceeded with plans for the project based on a 
agreement signed by A.H. Withey, a secretary of Butte Copper 
King W.A. Clark. On Withey's assurances, the Commissioners 
believed that Clark would agree to finance the project and 
then relinquish control of it to the settlers upon payment 
of the bonds. But, on his return to the state, Clark 
refused to honor his secretary's agreement.Bradford and 
the Commission were unable to attract another backer, and 
the settlers who arrived were left idle and waiting for 
direction and materials to begin building." Clark 
continually avoided meeting with the ALGC to discuss the 
matter, which left Bradford anxious about the state of the 
project and about the settlers who had already arrived. 
"These people are poor," Bradford wrote to Wethey, "are they 
to be sacrificed?
As negotiations dragged on, the Commissioners could do 
little more for the settlers than encourage them to "keep a
‘̂State Examiner W. Hudnall to Governor Joseph K. Toole, 
"Report of State Examiner. Report on State Arid Land Grant 
Commission." 23 January 1903. MHS, RS 31-2-36.
^^Donald Bradford to Frank Banderob, Bridger, 2 8 June
1899. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
''Donald Bradford to A.H. We they, 30 June 189 9. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
stiff upper lip" and assure them that the “canal will be 
c onstructed“ By mid-1900, at least one settler's lip had 
unstiffened enough to start a lawsuit against the Commission 
in an attempt to force it to begin construction. When 
informed of this action, Bradford responded angrily, "You 
went down there with your eyes open and should not now 
undertake to lay the blame upon me. Just corral your 
impatience."^® This reaction contrasts sharply with 
Bradford's early contentions that the Board was "acting for 
the engineers and settlers. It was easy for Bradford to 
advise patience; he had not moved to the state with the 
expectation of being able to put in a crop on irrigated land 
within a year. These settlers had already sat through one 
growing season; if work on the project did not begin soon, 
they would lose another entire season. Work never did start 
on this project, and in its 1902 report, the ALGC stated 
that it had abandoned the project "because of difficulties 
that. . . arose.
Faced with the failures of these three attempts to 
irrigate land under the Carey Act, the ALGC turned a hopeful
'“‘Donald Bradford to D.H. Brooks, Bridger, 19 July 1899. 
MHS, RS 31-1-30.
*®Donald Bradford to E.M. Strife, Red Lodge, 19 April
1900. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
"®Donald Bradford to A.H. Wethey, 3 0 June 18 99. MHS, RS 
31-1-30.
■‘"ALGC report to Governor Joseph K. Toole, 22 January 
1902. MHS, MC 35-175-12.
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gaze toward the Dearborn District. The ALGC learned of the 
Dearborn land because of Bradford's interests in it.
Bradford had filed on 300,000 inches (7,500 cubic feet per 
second) of Dearborn River water on 18 July 1888. Later 
that year he had conveyed this water right to the Dearborn 
Canal Company. The trustees named in the company's articles 
of incorporation included Bradford and Henry Semple Ames, 
assistant trust officer of the Mississippi Valley Security 
and Trust Company of St. Louis. The St. Louis company later 
purchased the entire project and administered it through 
Ames. Original work on the system included the construction 
of a dam and the building of the upper section of the ditch, 
but work had ceased in 1890."’ For ten years the project 
remained stalled, a victim of poor economic conditions in 
the state following the Panic of 1893. Since an incomplete 
irrigation system possessed no value, the trustees needed to 
find a way to complete the project or lose their investment.
"’The "inch" has been replaced by the acre-foot as the 
standard unit of water measurement. "The 'inch' was the 
amount of water that could be delivered through a hole, one 
inch square in a vertical board dam under a certain 
pressure, varying in different localities... A second foot is 
one cubic foot of water every second." An acre-foot is the 
amount of water needed to cover an acre of land to a depth 
of one foot. State of Montana, First Biennial Report of the 
State Engineer and the Carev Land Act Board. (Helena : 
Independent Publishing Company, 1904), p. 17-18.
"’State of Montana, Second Biennial Report of Carev Land 
Act Board and State Engineer. 1905-1906. (Helena:
Independent Publishing Company, 1906), p. 11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 0
When the ALGC advertised for sealed bids "to construct 
water systems to irrigate and reclaim" the 36,000 acres of 
the Dearborn district (District No. 4) in late 1900, the 
Mississippi Valley Security and Trust Company, which 
controlled all the water in the district, safely offered the 
sole bid to reclaim the Dearborn area at $12.50 per acre."* 
Because construction of the Dearborn canal system had 
begun a decade earlier, the Commissioners hoped that this 
project would begin operations almost immediately. These 
hopes seemed realized in October of 1901 when the 
Commissioners prepared a large ceremony to celebrate the 
completion of the upper section of the Dearborn Canal and 
the reclamation of almost 11,000 acres. The Commissioners 
invited Governor Rickards and other prominent men from 
around the state to view the October 5 festivities, "This 
being the first Irrigation Canal owned and operated by a 
state on the American Continent..."®^
In spite of this apparently auspicious beginning of the 
Dearborn project, the ALGC soon began to encounter serious 
difficulties keeping settlers on the land. Although the 
Commission received numerous inquiries about the land and 
its potential, settlers refused to stay in the district.
®°ALGC Minutes. 1 November 1900.
'̂Second Biennial Report. 1905-1906. p. 12.
“D.A. Cory to Governor John E. Rickards, 1 October
1901. MHS, RS 31-1-31.
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Engineer George E. Wickes, the supervisor of the project, 
reported that "great unnecessary outlays" and "gross 
missmanagement [sic]" had characterized the project in the 
past,” and Marshall expressed apprehension over allegations 
that the Commission had issued to the Dearborn Canal Company 
bonds out of proportion to the work done.
A later report by a special investigator from the 
Interior Department concluded that, without an extensive 
reservoir system, the water supply was not sufficient to 
irrigate properly the 10,104.03 patented acres in the 
district, and that the Dearborn Canal Company had 
constructed only one small lateral to carry water from the 
canal to individual tracts of land. Without laterals, the 
canal water did not benefit the settlers because they could 
not get that water on their land.*® When the state 
conducted a survey of the Dearborn land in 1904, it found 
only two settlers residing there*®; this was three years 
after state officials celebrated the opening of this area to 
settlers and Commission Chairman Marshall had predicted that 
the district would soon be "teeming with the multitudinous
“George F. Wickes to D.A. Cory, 17 January 1902. MHS, 
RS 31-1-28.
“Thomas Marshall to D.A. Cory, 22 January 1902. MHS, 
RS 31-1-29.
**E.A. Keyes, Special Agent, to Secretary of the 
Interior, 20 November 1909, Forwarded to Governor Edwin 
Norris. MHS, MS 35-201-12.
*®First Biennial Report. 1903-1904, p. 27.
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hum of an industrious community."^" Although it appeared to 
be an example of a successful operation, the Dearborn 
project, like the other three irrigation districts, had 
actually reclaimed very little, if any, land by the end of 
1902 .
Although the ALGC had segregated land in four districts 
in Montana, it failed to construct a working irrigation 
system on any of them. Toole argued that the Commission had 
spread itself too thin in starting so many projects instead 
of concentrating on one and finishing it. But Commission 
members felt that it was not that the ALGC had overextended 
itself, but that it could not obtain adequate funding for 
any of the districts. As Marshall complained, the ALGC had 
been "born and set adrift without food or clothes," so the 
commission had to rely on its own attempts to interest 
financiers in ALGC bonds.*® Like the members of the 
Rickards' Commission, the Smith appointees repeatedly tried 
to convince potential backers that the ALGC bonds were a 
good and sound investment opportunity; but the example of 
failed irrigation bonds in California continued to hurt 
these efforts. At least one potential investor demanded 
certification from an engineer on the amount of water 
available for a project, since "$25,000,000 have been lost
*''Thomas Marshall to D.A. Cory, 15 November 1901. MHS, 
RS 31-1-29.
*®ALGC Report to Governor Joseph K. Toole, 2 2 January1902. MC 35-175-12.
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in California canals on account of insufficiency of water 
supply. In response to these complaints. Commissioner 
Bradford argued that such a loss would not occur in Montana 
because the Montana laws were "passed with a full knowledge 
of the California statutes and their effect." Montana bonds 
constituted a lien on the land and were secured by the 
improvement created by the expenditure. If the principle 
were not paid, then the mortgage could be foreclosed."® But 
financiers were not willing to risk their investments in 
irrigation projects that had a history of failure unless the 
state agreed to guarantee their interest payments.
Board members agreed that a state guarantee would 
vastly improve their ability to obtain financing for the 
bonds. If the state would guarantee the interest on ALGC 
bonds, Cory predicted, "we would have had fully half a 
million acres reclaimed and settled." He added that 
although the Carey bonds were a good proposition, "investors 
seem to want better security than land and water rights.""' 
Large investment institutions, Reed reported, refused to 
touch the ALGC bonds; "they prefer," he stated, "to have 
their funds lie idle in the vaults than to take these bonds
"C.O. Reed to D.A. Cory, 19 May 1900. MHS, RS 31-1-26.
"“Donald Bradford to A.D. Mahon of New York, 20 June 
1899. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
“D.A. Cory to C.E. Wentland of Denver, 5 October 1900. 
MHS, RS 31-1-30,
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at any p r i c e . T h e  legislature continually refused to add 
such a guarantee to the ALGC bonds. Although many state 
leaders recognized the benefits of irrigation, they wanted 
it achieved at no cost to the state.
In an attempt to offset the ALGC's inability to 
guarantee investment in the projects, the Commissioners 
issued the bonds on Districts No. 2 and 4 at the highest 
price permitted under the state Carey law, $12.50 an acre. 
According to the provisions of the act creating the State 
Arid Land Grant Commission, issuing the bonds a t ’$12.50 per 
acre meant that, on average, each acre of land with 
perpetual water right in these districts would have to be 
sold for $15.00 to meet the contractor's price plus the 
twenty percent the Commission deposited in the state's fund 
for Carey projects. In addition, each year the average 
price per acre would increase by six percent to cover the 
interest on the bonds. The Commission raised the price per 
acre to the maximum allowed to attract investors; but the 
increased price meant that Carey settlers would have to pay 
more to purchase the land and water rights. Although 
examples from Idaho showed that farmers were willing to pay 
up to $25 per acre for irrigated land with water rights.
'C.O. Reed to D.A. Cory, 8 May 1901. MHS, RS 31-1-26
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they were not as willing to pay such high prices for Montana 
land that was not fully irrigated/'
Upon assuming the governorship in 1901, Joseph Toole 
began to investigate the ALGC more thoroughly and discussed 
repealing the legislation creating the commission/' He 
asked State Examiner W. Hudnall to examine the operations of 
the ALGC*^ and in November of 1901 requested from Marshall a 
"full and complete report" of the commission/* In his 
Governor's message of January 1901, Toole had little 
positive to say about the Commission. Toole stated that 
although the ALGC had segregated four districts in Montana, 
"it does not appear from any information at hand that any 
land has ever been reclaimed." He argued that although 
Carey enterprises had the potential to be of great benefit 
to the state, he wanted the Commission to refrain from 
trying to start so many different projects and instead
"In 1903 Idaho began construction on the Twin Falls 
South Side Project, the largest Carey Act project in the nation. The contracting company had "little difficulty 
attracting settlers, who paid $25 an acre for water rights." Dunbar, Robert G ., Forging New Rights in Western Water. 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 41.Other projects in Idaho and Wyoming were not always so 
successful, but the price paid per acre at the Twin Falls project demonstrates that good irrigated land in the region commanded high prices.
*“D.A. Cory to C.O. Reed, 14 December 1900. MHS, RS 31-1-30 .
"State Examiner W. Hudnall to D.A. Cory, 13 November1901. MHS, RS 31-1-39.
"Governor Joseph K. Toole to Thomas Marshall, 18 November 1901. MHS, RS 31-1-39.
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"concentrate its energies towards getting some material 
results from one or more of the schemes said to be under 
way." Toole recommended that the state prohibit the ALGC 
from starting any more new projects and permit it to work 
only on those projects already inaugurated, “and such of 
these only as in justice and fair dealing under contractual 
relations ought to proceed to completion
In response to this and other attacks on state- 
sponsored irrigation projects and the ALGC, Donald Bradford 
contributed an article to the Great Falls Tribune in 
December of 1901 defending the Commission and extolling its 
contributions to the state. Bradford argued that irrigation 
projects were better left to the states. If the federal 
government were to control these projects, he argued, the 
big cattle ranchers would take advantage of the opportunity 
to control even more water and land than they already had; 
ranchers had done just that under the federal Desert Land 
Act of 1877. An even greater expansion of grazing lands 
would be disastrous for the state, since large ranchers 
opposed the population growth that Bradford and others 
favored as a way to increase the state's wealth. Bradford 
claimed that "home rule" was best for Montana, and stated 
that the ALGC had already made a "beginning" in that 
direction. The ALGC, according to Bradford, had 
"constructed a system of canals... as comprehensive and as
Great Falls Tribune. 9 January 1901, p. 1 and 3
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scientific as would the government." He further asserted 
that the ALGC rules provided "absolute justice" in 
distributing water at a minimal cost. All that Bradford 
asked from the government was for it to lend its credit to 
guarantee irrigation district bonds. Bradford and the other 
Commissioners had often argued that if the ALGC bonds were 
guaranteed, then they would sell easily and the state could 
initiate a multitude of successful irrigation projects.'® 
Bradford failed to admit the patent failures of the 
Commission or to acknowledge that although ALGC rules 
provided “absolute justice" in water matters, no Carey 
settlers had yet received any water from the Commission's 
projects. Bradford's position revealed his ignorance of 
irrigation engineering and expressed the commonly held 
belief that building canals and reservoirs meant nothing 
more than digging a ditch or throwing up a dam. "There is 
no great mystery attached to the building of canals and 
reservoirs...," Bradford informed the Tribune's readers,
"The land is here; so is the water and reservoir sites can 
be found in every coulee and depression in the mountains."'® 
But Bradford failed to add that most of the sites that 
could be easily irrigated had already been reclaimed.
Fellow Commissioner David Cory had admitted to an inquirer a 
month earlier that the Commission had experienced problems
'®Great Falls Tribune. 22 December 1901, p. 11. 
'®Ibid.
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because, "all the land capable of inexpensive irrigation has
been t a k e n , T h e  extensive reservoirs and canal systems
needed to reclaim the remaining arid land had to be
carefully designed and constructed; such efforts would
require more work and money than implied by Bradford's
casual statement about filling coulees with water.
Bradford, the official entrusted with the most authority for
initiating Carey projects in Montana, underestimated the
amount of time and money needed to reclaim arid districts
because he continued to follow this simplistic view toward
the construction of irrigation systems.
In the ALGC report to Toole in January of 1902,
Marshall outdid Bradford in extolling the tremendous
opportunities available to the state through the Carey Act.
The Commission, Marshall wrote, "has begun the great work of
making homes for the masses," Marshall admitted that the
ALGC had only made a beginning in its quest to reclaim
government land, but put much of the blame for its slow
beginning on the legislation creating the commission. The
legislature, he complained, had given the commission
the semblance of power and opportunity for good, but it was only the semblance of power and opportunity, 
because no funds were placed at its disposal and only the running streams and dry prairies were given it as a basis for credit with which to build great canals and
"'D.A. Cory to John R. Commons, N.Y., 19 December 1900MHS, RS 31-1-30.
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resevoirs [sic] and reclaim vast areas for the supportof hundreds and thousands of souls."'
According to Marshall, if given the proper power, the ALGC 
could fulfill its promise and help the state enter a new era 
of prosperity.
In spite of his flowery rhetoric and overly optimistic 
view of the potential for Carey projects, Marshall made a 
strong point. The legislature had created the ALGC to 
perform miracles at almost no cost to the state. The state 
wanted irrigated land and prosperous farmers, but state 
officials did not want to pay for the process of obtaining 
them. The ALGC officials had to face the humiliation of 
being continually rejected in their attempts to secure 
financing from outside sources for their projects. This 
rejection had resulted in the acceptance of several ill- 
planned, ill-surveyed projects simply because someone had 
expressed a willingness to invest in them. Considering the 
limitations of the Carey legislation in the state, it is 
surprising that the ALGC managed to interest anyone in these 
projects; it should not be surprising that these weaknesses 
prevented the projects from succeeding. Although Marshall 
overestimated what the Carey Act could do (none of the 
Western states ever patented the full 1,000,000 acres 
permitted them), he had observed that other states, such as 
Wyoming and Idaho, were able to make the act work and
"'ALGC report to Governor Joseph K. Toole, 22 January
1902. MHS, MC 35-175-12.
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correctly argued that the weaknesses of the Commission 
resulted from the deficiencies of the state law. If Montana 
wanted to reclaim land under the Carey Act, it would have to 
provide more support for the Arid Land Grant Commission.
Although most continued to maintain an optimistic view 
of their work, some Commissioners did admit to the 
limitations of their work. In September of 1902, when the 
Commission was facing investigations by Toole and State 
Examiner Hudnall, Cory lamented that although "Considerable 
work could have been done" by the Commission with a little 
more cooperation from the state, the "government scheme for 
building reservoirs for reclamation of our arid lands is 
really the proper one and I think the only practical one for 
reclaiming the millions of acres of now almost valueless 
l a n d s . C o r y  realized that in comparison to the huge 
amounts of money that the federal government could pour into 
reclamation projects, the efforts of the ALGC to create a 
few small irrigation systems seemed feeble at best. Toole 
and his administration were left to determine the fate of 
the Arid Land Grant Commission and the Carey Land Act in 
Montana.
■'̂ D.A. Cory to C.B. Guittard, Assistant Librarian, Ohio 
State U ., 15 September 1902. MHS, RS 31-1-30.
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Chapter 3 
The Carey Land Act Board, 1903-1965
Although the ALGC had failed to reclaim any land in 
Montana, State Examiner Hudnall and Assistant State Examiner 
F.H. Ray both advised Governor Toole to maintain some state 
agency to take advantage of the Carey Act. They did, 
however, recommend changes to make that agency more 
effective. Instead of abolishing the ALGC entirely, they 
advised Toole, the state should improve the Commission to 
make it more efficient and less costly. Ray argued that,
"The future of Montana, her growth in wealth and homes, 
depends first and most on the development of her 
agricultural resources and that means irrigation." Since 
Montana was "only one of sixteen" states included under the 
Federal Reclamation Act of 1902, it "ought not depend 
entirely on National aid." Ray compared Montana's Carey Act 
efforts to those of Wyoming and Idaho; these states
41
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possessed "less natural advantages" for irrigation, yet were 
continuing to benefit from the Carey Act.-
Hudnall's report concluded that the ALGC suffered from 
a lack of funds and want of a state engineer. The primary 
problem with funding came from the unwillingness of the 
legislature to appropriate money for the Commission and the 
reluctance of private investors to buy the ALGC bonds. 
Hudnall suggested that state officials be included as board 
members to eliminate salary costs and most travel expenses." 
Like Ray, Hudnall pointed to the examples of Idaho and 
Wyoming to show that the Carey Act could work; both rejected 
Toole's tentative plan to end completely the state's 
attempts to irrigate Carey land.
In 1903, the legislature repealed the law that had 
created the Arid Land Grant Commission and replaced it with 
legislation establishing the Carey Land Act Board (CLAB) and 
the Office of the State Engineer. The legislature created 
the CLAB to administer the Carey Act within Montana and 
included as permanent Board members the State Engineer as 
chairman, the Secretary of State and the State Examiner.
The law specified that the state would not pay these Board
‘F.H. Ray, Assistant State Examiner, to Governor Joseph 
K. Toole, "Proposed Water Right and Irrigation Code. Being 
a part of the supplement to Report of the ALGC." 20 
December 1902. MHS, MC 35-175-12.
"Report of State Examiner W. Hudnall to Governor Joseph 
K. Toole, 23 January 1903. MHS, RS 31-2-36.
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members any additional salary for their Carey duties, but it 
did allow for the payment of travel expenses.^ In March, 
the Governor appointed John W. Wade as State Engineer at a 
salary of $2,500 per year.' Secretary of State George M.
Hays and Examiner Hudnall joined Wade as the first members 
of the Board.
Initially the powers of the Board were very limited and 
confined primarily to supervising the projects begun by the 
now-defunct ALGC.̂ These limitations reflected Toole's 
belief that the State should complete the districts already 
segregated before it attempted to initiate more Carey 
projects. Since it could not begin any new projects, the 
CLAB had to focus its attention on the Billings, Big Timber 
and Dearborn Districts.
Like the previous legislation that created the ALGC, 
the new act specified in several places that the new Board 
could not create any debts that the state was obliged to 
pay. As originally established, the Carey Land Act Board
^According to the legislation, the State Engineer was to be appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Senate ; 
he served a four-year term. Rules and Regulations of the 
Carev Land Act Board of the State of Montana, 1909, p. 7.
^Governor Joseph K. Toole to State Engineer John W. 
Wade, 7 March 1903. MHS, MS 35-201-10.
F̂irst Biennial Report. 1903-1904, p. 19.
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would simply complete the ALGC contracts still outstanding 
and "protect the State's interest.""
Reacting both to the failures of the ALGC in its 
efforts to initiate large irrigation projects and the new 
competition from the federal government, the Board members 
decided to concentrate on small, isolated tracts of land, 
"each too small too [sic] engage the Government service, so 
that the Government will not undertake their reclamation. 
These comparatively smaller tracts are logical fields for 
State enterprise. The CLAB members realized that they 
could not compete with the Federal Government and its easy 
payment terms for settlers on Reclamation land, so the Board 
could not afford to attempt the construction of large 
projects. But, as the Board pointed out, national funds had 
already been allocated for the Milk River project in 
Montana; since the government had to spread its efforts 
across all the arid states, Montana was not likely to 
receive any new projects for some time. Thus, the state 
needed to look to the Carey Act to increase irrigation in 
the state.®
®Rules and Regulations of the Carev Land Act Board, 
1909, p. 7-8.
’Report of CLAB to Governor Joseph K. Toole, 30 
November 1904, p. 10-11. MHS, RS 32, Records of the Carey 
Land Act Board of the State of Montana, Box 3, Folder 23.
’First Biennial Report, 1903-1904, p. 30.
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In 1905, the state legislature increased the Board's 
powers. Most notably it gave the CLAB the authority to 
enter into new contracts to reclaim and to settle Carey 
lands. The legislature also added limitations to the act to 
try to force the Board and its contracting companies to 
complete all projects in a reasonable amount of time. The 
new legislation stated that, "No contract shall be made by 
the Board which requires a greater time than five years for 
the construction of the works, and all contracts shall state 
that the work shall begin within one year from the date of 
contract, and thereafter to be prosecuted diligently to 
completion."® If a company failed to begin construction 
within the specified time or in accordance to the contract, 
the State could declare the contract null and void. The act 
also specified that, although the contracting company would 
maintain and operate the irrigation system during the 
settlement process, when 90% of the perpetual water rights 
in the project had been sold, the construction company would 
transfer the system to the settlers and others who owned the 
water rights.’®
One of the most important changes the legislature made 
in the state Carey legislation was in the method of payment 
for the irrigation systems. The legislature did not permit
®Rules and Regulations of the Carey Land Act Board, 
1909, p. 11.
"Ibid.
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the CLAB to issue bonds or warrants to support its projects. 
Attracting investors for the irrigation projects was left to 
contracting companies; it was no longer part of the Board's 
duties. But the legislature did give the CLAB the 
responsibility of paying off the ALGC debt. The authors of 
the 1905 law estimated that the ALGC owed $5,707.65 to the 
state and $18,697.45 to bondholders.“ They assumed the 
Board would use the money brought in through the sale of 
Carey lands to pay CLAB expenses, settle the ALGC debt, and 
create a fund to reclaim other arid lands.“
The 1905 law set the price for Carey land at a minimum 
of fifty cents and a maximum of two dollars and fifty cents 
per acre. It also stated that every application for entry 
had to be accompanied by a contract for perpetual water 
right for those acres and the maximum price per acre of the 
water right had to be included in the contract under which 
the project would be constructed. The contract also had to 
state the amount of water the canal company guaranteed for 
each water right share purchased by the settler. In most 
contracts the water share entitled the purchaser to 1 1/2 
acre feet for each acre with a water right. If a settler 
failed to make proper payments for the water right, the
“These figures on the ALGC debt do not include the 6% 
interest attached to the bonds; the interest accrued from 
the date of issuance. Rules and Regulations of the Carey 
Land Act Board. 1909, p. 16.
“Ibid.
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company selling the water right had a first lien on the land 
and could foreclose on it. The act also permitted the CLAB 
to set other terms of sale, and to lease Carey land, 
provided "that such occupancy shall not preclude any person 
desiring to settle upon such lands from doing so at any 
time.
Board members were optimistic about their new duties 
and responsibilities. Citing the results of the past two 
years, in which considerable progress had been made in the 
construction of the Billings Bench project, the Board 
concluded in 1906 that it was "entirely practicable, and 
even desirable, for the State to continue to avail itself of 
the privilege" of the Carey Act."®
Governor Toole continued to work closely with the Board 
until February of 1908, when, citing ill health, he resigned 
from office and was replaced by Lieutenant Governor Edwin 
Norris of Dillon. In his statement of resignation, Toole 
reflected on the changes that had occurred during his tenure 
in office, including the advances in reclamation and dry 
land farming, "making homes for thousands and adding 
millions of dollars annually to our permanent wealth.""*
""Rules and Regulations of the Carev Land Act Board. 
1909, p. 12-13.
"“Ibid, p. 16.
"̂Second Biennial Report, 1905-1906, p. 3.
"*The Helena Independent, 2 February 1908, p. 2.
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Although Norris lacked Toole's intimate experience with the 
ALGC and CLAB, he also took an active interest in the 
state's Carey projects. During his six years as governor, 
Norris helped to guide the CLAB and to defend it against 
critics .
There were many critics of the Board in its early 
years. Like the Arid Land Grant Commissioners, the CLAB 
members were often so intent on creating viable irrigation 
projects that they permitted applications on land that could 
not be easily irrigated, and allowed continuous delays on 
the part of construction companies. Their desire to prove 
the new Board a success led the CLAB members to accept 
excuses and extend deadlines that made the Board look 
incompetent, or at least unsuccessful. The problems of the 
Dearborn Project illustrate well the difficulties 
encountered by the Board as it struggled to construct viable 
and profitable irrigation projects under the provisions of 
the new state laws.
DEARBORN PROJECT
When State Engineer Wade accepted his new duties, he 
conducted investigations of the Carey projects begun by the
''A Great Falls Tribune story, written the day after Norris' death on 25 April 1924, praised Norris for helping 
Montana make the "transition from an era of 'wide open 
spaces' to an agricultural state." According to this story, 
Norris, who served as governor from 1908-1913, played a 
"vital part in establishing the state in its new sphere." 
Great Falls Tribune. 26 April 1924, p. 1.
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ALGC. After Wade presented his report on the Dearborn 
District to the Governor, Toole expressed outrage and 
denounced the "discreditable conduct in the irrigation 
project." This conduct included the overpricing of water 
rights, the overissuing of bonds, and the failure of the 
construction company to build laterals to carry water from 
the main canals to individual tracts of land."®
Representatives of the Dearborn Canal Company, 
especially Henry Semple Ames, conducted a spirited defense 
of the project through letters and two days of hearings 
before the Board. Board members and Ames argued extensively 
over the definition of reclamation, the necessity of 
laterals, and whether or not the Board should accept the 
work done on the district. When Ames decided to pursue the 
issue in court, Wade scathingly condemned the Dearborn Canal 
district as "a disgrace to the fair name of our State.""® In 
its Biennial report published in 190 6, the Board recommended 
legislative action, "whereby all proceedings in the District 
No. 4, known as the Dearborn Canal Scheme, be declared null 
and void. Governor Toole agreed with this conclusion.""
"^Governor Joseph K. Toole to CLAB, 3 0 March 1904. MHS, 
MC 35-201-10.
"̂ Second Biennial Report. 1905-1906, p . 9 .
''Ibid, p. 28.
'"Ibid, p. 26.
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In spite of all its angry rhetoric, however, the Board 
eagerly accepted an offer from Ames to draw up a new 
contract to reclaim the Dearborn District. Faced with the 
prospect of losing over 30,000 acres of Carey land, the 
Board decided that it would be worthwhile for the state to 
give the Dearborn Company one more chance. The Board had 
not yet completed a project, and the Dearborn district still 
seemed tantalizingly promising. In an abrupt about-face, 
the Board reported in 1908 that the new plans for the 
district appeared "good and sufficient" to settle the area 
during the year 1909. "There now seems little doubt," the 
Board stated, "that the District will soon be a settled 
community.
This optimistic statement provided an interesting 
contrast to an allegation by the Board just two years 
earlier that it was "impossible for the State to complete 
the reclamation of said l a n d s . T h e  Board members, and 
especially State Engineer Wade, still hoped for the best out 
of the Dearborn district. They continued to feel pressure 
to produce a successful project. By 1909, Montanans were 
enthusiastically supporting the dry land farming movement, 
which threatened popular support for irrigation projects. 
From the Board members' actions, it would appear that the
^^Third Biennial Report of the State Engineer and of the 
Carey Land Act Board, 1907-1908. MHS, RS 32-3-23.
’̂CLAB to Governor Joseph K. Toole, 2 November 19 05,
MHS, MC 35-201-10,
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CLAB was so anxious to prove its legitimacy that the members 
were willing to take chances that in 1904 they had decided 
not to risk.
The Board even contested an extremely negative report 
on the Dearborn District submitted by a special agent of the 
Department of the Interior. The Board assured Governor 
Norris that "it never has before been questioned nor in the 
slightest degree doubted that this project is feasible. 
Instead of proceeding with plans to cancel the project, 
Norris and the Board asked the Department of the Interior 
for deadline extensions in the District so the Dearborn 
Canal Company could complete its work. The Board then 
accepted two transferrais of ownership of the canal project 
before it finally voted to void the construction contract in 
1910 .
Frustrated with its continued failure to reclaim and
settle the Dearborn lands, the Board eventually concluded
that it would be best for the state to relinquish all the
lands in the district. In its Fourth Biennial Report, the
Board explained its reasons for relinquishing the lands as
well as its previous reluctance to make this final decision.
This Board has been exceedingly loth to take this 
stand--thus possibly shutting the door of opportunity 
in our faces which seemed fully open to us to place
^^CLAB to Governor Edwin Norris, 25 October 1909, MHS, 
MC 35-201-12.
^^CLAB to Governor Edwin Norris, 5 January 1910. MHS, 
MC 35-201-13.
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upon this splendid tract of now desert land a community 
of prosperous and happy farmers, and thus bring to the State a great and permanent benefit.’"
Although reluctant to part with the lands, the Board 
decided that the Dearborn fiasco had tainted the efforts of 
the state to irrigate lands in Montana through the Carey 
Act. Since the CLAB was beginning to receive some positive 
recognition for its progress in the Billings and Big Timber 
districts, it did not want the negative publicity 
surrounding the Dearborn project to tarnish its new image of 
success. The Board may also have simply been tired of the 
Dearborn District. For over 10 years the state had pursued 
the elusive dream of reclaiming 33,000 acres in the Dearborn 
Valley; the CLAB finally decided the effort was not worth 
the sacrifice. But through its experiences with District 
No. 4, the Board, the Governor and the state legislature 
became aware of the larger problems with the state's Carey 
legislation and began work to change the law to make it more 
effective.
By 1912, the legislature had made significant changes 
in the Board. These changes reflected some of the lessons 
learned from the experiences with the Dearborn project. 
Although the State Engineer remained as an adviser to the
^®State of Montana, Fourth Biennial Report of the State 
Engineer and of the Carev Land Act Board of the State of 
Montana. 1909-1910. {Helena: Independent Publishing
Company, 1910), p. 7.
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Board, the Governor replaced him as chairman in order to 
allow the engineer more time for field investigation of 
irrigation projects- New legislation also removed the State 
Examiner, who usually possessed little expertise in 
irrigation matters, from the Board and replaced him with the 
State Attorney General, a person qualified to interpret 
contracts and water laws.
The Board also took steps to maintain more control over 
Carey projects in an attempt to check abuses by contracting 
companies. "The principal reason for the difficulties of 
the past," the Board admitted, "seem [sic] to have been lack 
of experience and precedents in the operation and 
administration" of the Carey Act. The rules were strict 
enough, but the actual operation of the Board was lax; the 
Board had not adequately investigated the lands to be 
segregated.^’ A more intensive investigation of the 
Dearborn lands, for example, would have alerted the state at 
the beginning about the difficulties of irrigating that 
area. As part of its new program the Board began to 
relinquish lands, such as District No. 4, and to reduce 
materially the acreage of other projects "to conform to the 
probable water supply available for reclamation." Taking 
such strict measures to maintain feasible projects at
’̂State of Montana, Fifth Biennial Report of the State Engineer and of the Carev Land Act Board of the State of 
Montana, 1911-1912, (Helena: Independent PublishingCompany, 1912), p. 234.
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reasonable prices would serve notice to others "that 
dilatory tactics would not be countenanced, but projects 
must be taken up in a businesslike manner and pushed to 
consummation with all due diligence or the segregation would 
be cancelled."^®
In its Fifth Biennial Report, the Board noted the 
cancellation of the Dearborn Project (36,586.42 acres), the 
Red River Project (7,885.52 acres) and the Franklin Project 
(5,142.30 a c r e s ) A l t h o u g h  it continued to carry several 
other non-productive districts, the Board's willingness to 
relinquish segregated lands reflected part of a new 
commitment to feasible projects. Part of the lesson of the 
Dearborn project had been learned. The Board realized that 
not every site in Montana could be profitably irrigated and 
not every company would perform its irrigation duties fully 
and honestly.
But, again, the Board's rhetoric was more impressive 
than its actions. Although it did cancel three projects in 
1911 and 1912, it carried other "non-quiescent" projects for 
several decades before finally relinquishing them. In spite 
of its expressed determination to cancel projects rather 
than to allow their construction deadlines to be extended 
indefinitely, the Board continued to permit extensions on 
all of its remaining projects. The CLAB extended one
''Ibid.
"Ibid, p.259
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district's deadline for completion by almost 40 years. It 
was easier to discuss terminating projects than it was 
actually to cancel the segregations and to lose the 
opportunity of creating successful, prosperous districts. 
Every acre less than the 1,000,000 acres offered to the 
state under the Carey Act that the state did not irrigate 
and thus obtain from the federal government, was seen as 
lost land. Reports of successes in Idaho and Wyoming also 
contributed to the desire of Montana officials to take 
advantage of the government offer.
After the demise of the Dearborn District, Board 
members continued to extend deadlines, but tended to focus 
more attention on those projects that showed real progress 
toward construction of viable irrigation systems. Most of 
the CLAB papers after 1910 deal with the Valier and Billings 
projects, both of which succeeded in reclaiming land and 
selling that land and water rights to "actual" settlers.
The CLAB's first triumph came on the Billings Bench project. 
The Billings success justified the Board's existence and 
proved that Montana could build a working irrigation system 
under the Carey Land Act.
BILLINGS
The Billings Bench project (District No. 1) became the 
first Carey Land Act project in Montana to be completed
'First Biennial Report, 1903-1904, p. 30
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successfully and transferred to the water users of the 
district. In 1903 the CLAB signed a contract with the 
Billings Land and Irrigation Coir.cany.'* Under this 
energetic company, construction of the irrigation system 
progressed rapidly. By 1905, the Billings Land and 
Irrigation Company had completed construction of a 1,847- 
foot tunnel, a 900-foot flume, and almost 100 miles of 
canals and laterals.
Trouble arose on the Billings Bench District, however, 
when that project neared completion and negotiations began 
for the transferal of the irrigation system to the water 
users of the area, who, according to the dictates of the 
law, had formed the Billings Bench Water Users Association 
(BBWUA). In 1908 these water users hired a former Montana 
State College professor and engineer, E. Tappan Tannatt, to 
examine the project in preparation for the transfer of 
ownership. Tannatt discovered serious problems with the 
system including seepage and "dangerous and inadequate" 
wooden headgates. He advised the BBWUA to demand an 
immediate examination by the State Engineer and to "insist 
that he require the company to live up to its promises and 
plans." Tannatt seemed to trust the State Engineer and
“CLAB Minutes. 20 June 1903. MHS, RS 32-3-21 
^̂Second Biennial Report. 1905-1906, p . 5.
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recommended chat the Billings settlers rely on Wade to 
remedy the alleged problems.'"
District settlers expressed concern when apprised of 
Tannatt's report because they did not want to pay for 
construction errors in the system that, they assumed, the 
construction company should remedy. After the settlers 
assumed control of the project, they would have to pay all 
maintenance and repair costs; if they could force the 
company to improve the system before the transfer, they 
could avoid the payment for these improvements and repairs.
Learning of Tannatt's report. State Engineer Wade 
assured the settlers that "both contractor and settler shall 
have, at our hands, simple justice." He promised that the 
Board would protect the settlers "against mistakes 
inadvertent, or frauds intentional on the part of the 
contracting company. " To Governor Norris, however, Wade 
suggested that some of the settlers' complaints were 
unwarranted. "I feel," he wrote, "that the whole matter of
“E. Tappan Tannatt, Engineer, to J. T. Connall of the BBWUA, 5 September 1908. MHS, MC 35-202-4. According to the Methods of Procedure published by the CLAB in 1909, the 
policy of the Board was "to faithfully protect the interests 
of the settler with proper regard to the rights of the 
contractor." Rules and Regulations of the Carev Land Act 
Board, 1909, p. 18.
’̂ State Engineer John Wade to W.M. Johnson, Attorney 
from Billings, 7 November 1908. MHS, MC 35-201-11.
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their complaints arises from their lack of knowledge of 
irrigation; this a little time will help."’̂
After conducting his own "careful review...of the 
@r%tire line and of all the works of this irrigation system, " 
Wade described Tannatt's report as a "merciless and 
unprofessional attack," Wade accused Tannatt of reporting 
only what the BBWUA wanted him to report. According to 
Wade, Tannatt's only motivation to produce the condemnatory 
report on the Billings project was financial.
Predictably, the Billings settlers reacted with anger to 
Wades' conclusions. They expressed suspicion that the chief 
engineer of the Billings Land and Irrigation Company, who 
lived in Washington State, had accompanied Wade on his 
inspection. Wade had not informed the BBWUA of his 
examination, so no representative of the settlers was on 
hand. This, the settlers argued, "does not look exactly 
right to us." Their lawyer informed Governor Norris that,
"I may say that Mr. Wade admits that he is prejudiced in 
favor of the Company, and his actions certainly show that 
this is true."” After this negative report, the Billings
“State Engineer John Wade to Governor Edwin Norris, 7 
November 1908. MHS, MC 35-201-11.
“State Engineer John Wade to CLAB, 23 November 1908. 
MHS, MC 35-202-4.
”W. M. Johnson, Billings Attorney, to Governor Edwin 
Norris, 3 December 1908. MHS, MC 35-201-11.
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settlers communicated directly with Norris, rather chan 
going through either Wade or the CLAB.
Billings settler L.W. Burg wrote a personal letter to 
Norris relating stories of district settlers who were unable 
to obtain water from the project. He told of Ennis Gill, 
who had been "trying for three years to get a crop." Gill 
lived "about 12 miles East of billings [sic] and faithfully 
put in a crop each year, with a promise of water, he has had 
a hard row to hoe...he has done all on his part, but lack of 
water has been his undoing." It was "certainly heart 
rending, " Burg wrote, "'to see the field all tilled and an 
effort made for a crop, with nothing to show for the farmers 
[sic] efforts, except a blighted crop, all for the lack of 
water." Burg accused the Billings Land and Irrigation 
Company of providing some farmers with water, because that 
"was necessary so as to have a sample to show prospective 
easy marks, so as to sell more land.
It is not clear what impact Burg's sad story had on 
Governor Norris, but Wade continued to favor the Billings 
Land and Irrigation Company against the attacks of the 
settlers and Tannatt. In his next report to the CLAB on the 
Billings District, Wade clearly sided with the contracting 
company against any criticisms of the engineers sent by the 
CLAB to inspect the project. In spite of some criticisms
'®L.W. Burg, Billings Settler, to Governor Edwin Norris 
17 May 1909. MHS, MC 35-201-12.
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from one of the inspecting engineers, Wade concluded that, 
"it is manifest that ... no call for other or extra work or 
for any sort of emendation can be made upon the company.
Wade continued to fight the settlers over the condition 
of the Billings irrigation system. Tannatt swore to Norris 
that he would fight to his last dollar to expose Wade, "as I 
feel that it is but justice to the citizens of Montana and 
to my profession that men of this stamp and disposition be 
publically [sic] known and understood." The CLAB had 
already preferred charges against Tannatt with the State 
Board of Education. In return, Tannatt, who stated that he 
had received "outrageous treatment" from Wade in Billings, 
vowed to file charges with the legislature against Wade for 
"improper official conduct and for incompetency.
Wade's refusal to consider the settlers' complaints was 
the result, perhaps, of his almost fervent dedication to 
irrigation. He believed that only through irrigation could 
Montana prosper. Wade's convictions may have colored his 
judgement in the Billings District. It seems probable that 
Wade became convinced that he had to support the 
construction company because that company had built a 
successful project. The CLAB found it relatively easy to 
find farmers who wanted to purchase irrigated land; the
’̂State Engineer John Wade to CLAB, 25 October 1909.
MHS, MC 35-201-12.
*°E. Tappan Tannatt, Engineer, to Governor Edwin Norris, 
21 November 1910. MHS, MC 35-201-13.
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Board members found it much more difficult to find a 
competent irrigation company to build a relatively sound 
canal system. Wade sided with the company that had helped 
him toward the achievement of his goal--the creation of 
irrigated farmland in Montana. He was willing to dismiss 
the complaints of the project's farmers who could not 
appreciate how difficult it had been for the state to build 
a successful irrigation system under the Carey Act. The 
almost total lack of concern shown by Wade for the 
complaints of the settlers demonstrated clearlywhere his 
sympathies lay.
Wade supported the benefits provided by the Billings 
Bench project as depicted by the Billings Land and 
Irrigation Company in the 1910 CLAB Report. In the pro act 
summary provided for the Biennial Report, the Billings Land 
and Irrigation Company extolled the success of the Billings 
District. "Here, where six years ago was a desert covered 
with sage-brush...giving sustenance to nothing except a few 
sage hens and jack-rabbits, there is now a thriving 
community of prosperous and happy farmers.”" The farmers 
in this district had paid over $15,000 in taxes for the year 
of 1910, and, the company estimated, the project had added 
three million dollars in taxable wealth to the city of 
Billings and had doubled the city's population. The company 
reported that it had sold 5,985.13 acres of the project to
^Fourth Biennial Report. 1909-1910, p . 4.
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"actual settlers, " who were "more than ordinarily prosperous 
and contented." The project was almost complete, except for 
some "small ditches and laterals. " This report fulfilled 
many of the hopes of the Board and Wade for a successful 
irrigation district that contributed to the economic 
prosperity and stability of the state. Faced with the 
seeming culmination of his wishes, it is hardly surprising 
that Wade chose to believe the construction company that had 
provided this boon to the state.
In early 1911, Wade's second term as State Engineer 
ended and Norris appointed Archibald Mahon to succeed him.” 
The biennial reports of the Board and State Engineer do not 
relate if Wade decided not to continue as State Engineer or 
whether Norris asked him to resign, but pressure from 
Tannatt's suit and hostility from the Billings settlers 
probably contributed to Wade's decision to leave his 
position.
After seven years of fighting, the Billings Land and 
Irrigation Company and the BBWUA finally reached an 
agreement in 1915 "for the turning over of the canal to the 
water users.""* The Merchants' Loan Company of Billings 
accepted trusteeship of the project until its completion.
"Ibid, p. 3-4.
"̂Fifth Biennial Report, 1911-1912, p. 10.
"R.E. Shepard, President of BL&I Company, to State 
Engineer Archibald Mahon, 8 May 1915. MHS, RS 32-2-1.
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and arranged with the BBWUA that the settlers would 
"maintain, operate and improve the canal as required by the 
State. The Billings Land and Irrigation Company agreed to 
complete the canal while the water users operated the 
system. The CLAB could not officially recognize this
however, until it had accepted the entire project 
as complete; until then it continued to hold the Billings 
Land and Irrigation Company responsible "for the faithful 
fulfilment of their contract."*®
Bank officials experienced the same difficulties with 
the water users as had the construction company. Only a few 
weeks after the Billings bank assumed the trusteeship of the 
project, one of the bank officers informed Mahon that the 
Board would have to act quickly to "take the Ditch off our 
hands." The officer had apparently already become the focus 
of settler abuse. He wrote to Mahon that "the only solution 
to the matter is to have the ditch in the farmers [sic] 
hands to stop their numerous complaints."*®
The Bank had to suffer these complaints until 20 
December 1920, when the state relinquished control of the 
Billings District to the BBWUA. To this date the district 
had segregated 13,223.54 acres, had colonized 12,264.62
*®Seventh Biennial Report of the State Engineer and of the Carev Land Act Board of the State of Montana. 1915-1916, 
(Helena: Independent Publishing Company, 1916), p. 80.
*®Roy J. Covert, Merchants Loan Company, to State 
Engineer Archibald Mahon, 27 July 1915. MHS, RS 32-2-1.
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acres, and irrigated annually 17,000 acres of crops on Carey 
Act land and non-Carey Act land. A total of $504,000 had 
been expended on the project.'" By 1926, the Billings 
project was providing water to 18,000 acres of diversified 
crops, including sugar beets, beans, alfalfa and small 
grains. The BBWUA reported that the "Billings Bench is rn 
the best condition of its history, as most of the poor 
farmers have been weeded out and the project is now being 
farmed by industrious farmers who know their trade and are 
making a success of their endeavors."** Only 857.85 acres 
of Carey land remained unsold in the district by 1927.**
The Billings Bench project provided the CLAB with a 
clear success story. In spite of problems with the transfer 
of land from the construction company to the settlers, the 
irrigation system had passed into the hands of the water 
owners. Settlement of the project was almost complete, and 
the project provided water to over 18,000 acres of land near
*"Tenth Biennial Report of the State Engineer and of the 
Carey Land Act Board, 1921-1922, p. 15. MHS, MC 35-202-2. 
The Billings Bench project provided water to all the Carey land settlers and also to settlers on non-Carey lands. When 
the ALGC segregated the district, it had to contend with 
privately held lands in the area and agreed that the Billings Land and Irrigation Company could sell excess water 
to farmers on these lands as long as it did not take away from the guaranteed water rights of the Carey settlers.
'^Twelfth Biennial Report of the State Engineer and of 
the Carey Land Act Board, 1925-1926, p. 12-13. MHS, MC 35- 
202-2 .
**CLAB to E.E. Tiffany of Billings, 25 August 1927.
MHS, RS 32-2-1.
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Billings, directly improving the prosperity of that city.
The project also illustrated how difficult it could be for 
the CLAB to reconcile the desires of both the settlers and 
the construction company in the matter of the transferal of 
the irrigation system.
The Board experienced similar problems a few decades 
later on its largest irrigation district. Although 
construction on the Valier project began in 1909, the 
transfer of ownership in the project did not occur until 
1953. A larger district than the Billings Bench project, 
the Valier project also experienced a more prolonged period 
of development and suffered through an even more tumultuous 
period of transferal of ownership than that experienced in 
the Billings area. But, like the Billings project, the 
success of the Valier district showed that in fertile areas 
with easily accessible water Carey projects could succeed if 
the companies building them could secure the money to back 
them.
VALIER PROJECT
In May of 1909, the Board entered into a contract to 
reclaim what would be its third successful district, the 
Valier project. The contract also established the Teton 
County Canal and Reservoir Company, a settlers' corporation. 
When the CLAB accepted the Valier system as complete and 90%
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of the water rights to the district were sold, the 
construction company had to convey the entire system to the 
Teton County Canal and Reservoir Company. Stock in this 
company consisted of water rights; the water right to one 
acre of land constituted one share of stock. All works on 
the project were "subject to approval" of the Carey Board, 
which had to accept the system in its entirety before the 
transfer to the settlers' corporation.^®
The contract for the district experienced numerous 
revisions, most of which were extensions of the deadline for 
completion of the system and colonization. The first 
contract of 1909 required that the construction company 
complete building in 1912 and settle the land by 1916.''
Later contracts extended the deadline eventually to 1951.
The Board also authorized increases in the price per acre 
for water rights from $40 in 1909, to $50 in 1912, $60 in 
1918, and $80 in 1921.” The Board granted these 
modifications for various reasons that included the 
bankruptcy of the company and colonization difficulties
“Conrad Land and Water Company Contract, 23 July 19 0 9 
MHS, RS 32-3-7.
“Ibid.
“The Valier Company argued that it needed to increase 
the price of water rights to $80 an acre, "for the reason that the cost of constructing and completing said irrigat 
Project is far greater than was originally anticipated at 
the time the foregoing Contracts were executed." Petitio 
of The Valier-Montana Land and Water Company to CLAB, 1 
December 1920. MHS, RS 32-3-13.
ion
n
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caused by World War I. Again, the CLAB demonstrated its 
willingness to ignore the intent of Carey legislation in the 
state and its own regulations about deadline extensions in 
order to continue to hold onto a potentially successful 
district.
The various construction companies on the Valier 
project experienced financial difficulties primarily because 
of problems with colonization.” With insufficient sales of 
water rights to settlers, the companies found it difficult 
to retire the project's bonds.” Company leaders complained 
about the "menace" of federal reclamation projects, which 
competed for settlers. Even when it did attract settlers, 
the construction companies often found that these farmers 
knew little about irrigation agriculture; many of them 
defaulted on their settlement payments.” Several times, 
the company requested the CLAB to send warning letters to 
settlers who were delinquent in making their final proofs. 
One report acknowledged that, "In securing settlers no
“The company constructing the Valier project underwent 
a variety of name changes. The company was first called the Conrad Land and Water Company, then the Valier-Montana Land 
and Water Company, The Valier-Montana Land and Water Company, and finally in 1944 it became The Valier Company.
“State Engineer C.S. Heidel to Francis A. Silver, 
Assistant U.S. Attorney, 25 August 1926. MHS, RS 32-2-27.
“This was not uncommon among farmers on new irrigation 
projects. F.H. Newell, head of the Reclamation Service from 
1902 to 1915, observed that most irrigation farmers were 
"'inexperienced' or 'adventurers' who expected 'easier 
things.'" Donald Pisani, "Reclamation and Social 
Engineering," p. 58.
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attention was paid to the colonists' former occupation, and 
it took longer to convert bookkeepers, clerks, dentists, etc 
into good farmers than had been anticipated."-’ In 1926, 
company officials reported that 30% of its settlers had not 
made payments over the last three years, and 58% had paid 
less than $5.00 an acre during the last three years.
Without a firm policy dispossessing these delinquent 
settlers, the company could not bring in enough money to 
satisfy its bondholders and complete the project.®’ The 
project ran at an operating loss of $35,000 in 1925.
By 1926, company officials wanted to complete the 
project as quickly as possible and turn it over to the 
Pondera County Land and Irrigation Company, the successor to 
the Teton County Canal and Reservoir Company. Time was 
running out. Investors had to be paid, the physical 
structure of the project was "rapidly deteriorating", and 
maintenance costs were rising.®*
State Engineer J.S. James investigated the Valier 
project in 1930 in response to a request from The Valier- 
Montana Land and Water Company (the third company working 
under a CLAB contract to build the irrigation system at 
Valier) for an examination to show that the project was
®*McMi11an-Hawley Report, June 1926. MHS, RS 32-3-15. J.H. MacMillan, Sr., of Minneapolis, was president of The 
Valier-Montana Land and Water Company after 10 August 1926
"Ibid, p. 13.
®*Ibid, p. 12.
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complete according to the contract. Although James found 
some deterioration of the system, he concluded chat if che 
company completed a few specific repairs and additional 
construction, the project could be approved by the CLAB.”
In spite of this positive report, by 1 October 1930, The 
Valier-Montana Company was in default of its contract for 
completion of the Valier p r o j e c t . I n  its last meeting for 
more than 10 years, the Board met in 193 2 to extend The 
Valier-Montana Company's deadline to 1935 for completing the 
project.^ After The Valier-Montana Company declared 
bankruptcy in 1942, the'CLAB signed a new contract with The 
Valier Company to complete the project.
The final phase in the development of the Valier 
project began in 1947, when the project's developers, 
settlers and engineers fought each other and state officials 
over the transferal of the system to the settlers. In that 
year The Valier Company asked the local district court to 
determine the legalities of the transfer of the Valier 
project to the settlers' corporation. Part of the CLAB's 
concern in this matter was the question of land The Valier
’’■Report on Contract Between The Carey Land Act Board 
of the State of Montana and The Valier-Montana Land and 
Water Company," by J.S. James, State Engineer, 15 April 
1930. MHS, RS 32-3-18.
’“State Engineer J.S. James to CLAB, 23 December 1931. 
MHS, RS 32-2-30.
“R.J. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State Water 
Conservation Board, to Governor Sam C. Ford, 4 September 
1947. MHS, RS 32-3-14.
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Company had acquired from delinquent purchasers. The Valier 
Company owned 20,000 of the 70,000 Carey acres within the 
district; thus, it controlled almost 3 0% of the stock in the 
Pondera County Land and Irrigation Company. The Valier 
Company contended that since these water rights and lands 
had already been sold once, they should no longer be subject 
to the restrictions of the Carey Act; it also contended that 
the sales should count toward the achievement of the 90% 
level of water rights sales that The Valier Company needed 
to reach before the project could be turned over to the 
settlers' corporation.“
The Pondera Company (the settlers' corporation), was 
concerned with the system's maintenance. Company leaders 
wanted the State Engineer to report on the construction and 
maintenance needed on the project.*^ However, Assistant 
State Engineer Oscar Moberg's careful investigation of the 
system prompted criticism from both The Valier Company and 
the settlers. The Valier Company, through its lawyer, 
Forrest H. Anderson, complained that Moberg was being much 
too thorough in his examination, especially since the CLAB 
had approved the Valier work once already--in 1932 with the
"Great Falls Tribune, 14 September 1947. Clipping,
MHS, RS 32-3-14.
"Twenty-Third Biennial Report of the State Engineer and 
of the Carey Land Act Board, 1947-48. MHS, MC 35-202-3.
"J.P. Freeman, Attorney for Pondera County Co., to^ 
State Engineer Fred Buck, 31 October 1947. MHS, RS 32-3-10.
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acceptance of James' report The settlers also protested 
that Moberg was moving too slowly and thoroughly in his 
inspection. Officials from the settlers' corporation wrote 
to the CLAB in July of 1949, that "ample time has been 
appropriated and used for the performance of the inspection 
of the system." They blamed the Board for the heightening 
of tensions around the project caused by "delayed 
information."** The settlers worried that extensive 
demands on the construction company might result in another 
bankruptcy that would delay completion even further.
Although they appeared to be completely at odds with 
each other, both companies wanted the same thing--completion 
of the system and its transferal to the settlers' 
corporation. Each appealed to the CLAB to get these goals 
accomplished in a way favorable to its side, but protested 
if the Board's actions hindered progress toward the transfer 
of the system. Moberg's report, which found fault with both 
the CLAB and The Valier Company, seemed to endanger that 
progress. Moberg blamed the CLAB for extending the deadline 
for completion of the project, "thus making the time for 
completion of reclamation and settlement a period of 42 
years where four years was originally given and not to 
exceed 15 years was intended under the terms of the Federal
“Forrest H. Anderson, Attorney for The Valier Company, 
to CLAB, 10 May 1949. MHS, RS 32-3-14.
**J. P . Seifert, Pondera County Canal and Reservoir 
Company, to CLAB, 2 July 1949. MHS, RS 32-3-10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Carey Act." The Valier Company deserved cricicism, Moberg 
stated, for creating "a lousy system" that it was trying to 
"ram down" the water users' throats. "It is my firm 
belief," he concluded, "that the present construction 
Company (The Valier Company) is not competent nor in a 
position to complete the construction of the Valier 
Irrigation Project according to the terms and specifications 
of the contract with the State."*’
Pressure from the settlers and The Valier Company 
caused Moberg to resign from the investigation in mid-1949. 
"It was intimated," he wrote in a statement concerning his 
resignation, "that the report would be so severe in its 
requirements on the Valier Company [sic] that the company 
would go broke again and would be unable to put the project 
in an acceptable condition."**
The Valier Company's engineer, George Ebner, argued 
that Moberg gave a "much-too-doleful picture, as to the 
maintenance work."** Reacting to pressure from the settlers 
and from The Valier Company to ensure the completion of the 
system's transfer. State Engineer Buck worked with Ebner to 
produce a joint recommendation on the project that was less
‘’Statement by Oscar E. Moberg, 20 July 1949. MHS, RS 
32-3-14.
“Ibid.
‘’George Ebner, "Analysis of the Report of Fred E. Buck, 
State Engineer, based on the inspection of the Valier 
Project by Oscar Moberg and dated September 30, 1949," 11 
March 1950. MHS, RS 32-3-18.
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severe in its requirements of The Valier Company than was 
Moberg's report. Buck presented the report to a meeting of 
settlers and The Valier Company officials in December of 
1950 in Conrad.’" Two years later stockholders finally 
approved the agreement reached at this meeting. The Valier 
Company agreed to perform certain construction work and pay 
$6,350 in lieu of other work; the Pondera County Company's 
acceptance of the money meant the acceptance of the project 
as "fully completed. After forty-four years, the 
settlers and the construction company reached an agreement 
on the project's transfer. Although Engineer Moberg had 
severely faulted the project, the water users apparently 
were willing to accept what they could get to help construct 
some repairs and secure the system under their control.
The question of the extensive shares of water stock 
held by The Valier Company was solved when the state 
legislature passed special legislation to allow the company 
to sell the land and appurtenant water rights. In June of 
19 52, The Valier Company sold 20,699.48 acres of land and
’"State Engineer Fred Buck to CLAB, 8 January 1951.
MHS, RS 32-3-14.
’'"Application of The Valier Company for Acceptance of 
Irrigation System for Transfer" to the State of Montana and 
CLAB, 30 June 1953. MHS, RS 32-3-13.
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14,052 shares of water stock. Nc :arey Act land remained 
for homesteading.'"
On 27 October 1953, Buck called the last formal meeting 
of the Carey Land Act Board."' At that meeting. Governor 
Hugo Aronson approved the Board's resolution to transfer the 
property of the Valier project to the Pondera County 
Company. This meeting ended the state's involvement in the 
Valier project."^
Other CLAB projects were not as successful as the 
Billings and Valier districts. The Board continued to carry 
three "non-quiescent" projects (the Teton, Flatwillow and 
Little Missouri Projects) until 1926 and 1931. These 
projects, on which little or no construction was ever 
attempted, attracted claims of fraud and scandal and damaged 
the developing prestige of the CLAB. A "real minature [sic] 
Oklahoma land rush" started on one project in 1913 as 
speculators tried to claim land in the irrigation district. 
Local people complained about bribes and kickbacks being
''State Engineer Fred Buck, "Report on the Physical 
Condition of the Valier Project," 27 July 1953. MHS, RS 32 
3-17 .
"State Engineer Fred Buck to CLAB, 24 November 1953. 
MHS, RS 32-3-6.
"CLAB Minutes. 2 7 November 19 53. MHS, RS 32-3-15.
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used to ensure the purchase of Carey land. in a later 
investigation of the project, State Engineer Mahon found 
that the submitted proposal for the district established 
water rights at "almost four times as much as the greatest 
flood of record."""
Such an overestimation was not uncommon during this 
period. In his examination of reclamationists in Montana, 
Stanley Davison observed that people often exaggerated the 
amount of water in streams, especially when influenced by 
spring runoffs. "Even engineers often were misled by the
apparent volume of water, and proceeded with irrigation 
works to distribute quantities of water that were not there 
except briefly during the seasonal runoff.""" This problem 
was exacerbated by the state's failure to compile the needed 
data on stream flows and to provide a central system for 
filing water rights claims. "[T]here is scarcely a State in 
the arid and semi-arid West," complained Engineer Wade in 
1910, "that is so slow in the compilation of data that is 
absolutely necessary to make use of what is not now already
Dunn, Harlowton Businessman to CLAB Secretary 
Ray, 5 August 1913. MHS, RS 32-1-2.
"®State Engineer Archibald Mahon to CLAB, 15 June 1914, 
35-201-13 -
""Stanley R. Davison, "Hopes and Fancies of the Early 
Reclamationists." In Historical Essays on Montana and the 
Northwest. edited by J.W. Smurr and K. Ross Toole, (Helena; 
The Western Press, 1957) . Reprinted in Montana's Past: 
Selected Essavs. edited by Michael Malone and Richard B. 
Roeder, (Missoula: University of Montana Publications in
History, 1973), p. 323-24.
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appropriated of these waters."'" State Engineer Mahon 
observed a few years later that demands from the Interior 
Department that the state provide water-flow records over a 
five-year period on proposed Carey projects hurt the CLAB's 
efforts. Such demands held up irrigation projects because 
the state did not have records on most streams. Mahon 
argued that estimates gave "fairly close results" and should 
be accepted."*
"Estimates" of stream flow and construction costs, 
however, created the biggest difficulties with the 
implementation of the Carey Act. The CLAB had to attract 
construction companies and investors into the state to build 
the Carey projects, so it had to offer attractive figures 
that promised high and quick returns to those who invested 
in the ventures. Underestimating the cost of construction 
and overestimating the available supply of water and fertile 
land served the initial purpose of the CLAB. But, because 
actual prices of construction were higher and irrigable 
acres were less than they had been led to expect, the 
investors invariably had to spend more and wait longer to 
realize any return on their investment. Many companies went 
bankrupt waiting for their projects to become successful. 
Montana also suffered a lack of accreditation procedures for
""Fourth Biennial Report, 1909-1901, p. 17.
’’state Engineer Archibald Mahon to Governor Samuel V. 
Steward, 16 October 1913. MHS, RS 32-1-2.
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engineers. As a CLAB secretary noted as late as 1940, "No 
law requiring registeration [sic] or licensing of engineers" 
existed in Montana. "Anyone may practice this 
profession."*® Although not qualified to practice 
irrigation engineering, project promoters could claim in 
their proposals the availability of vast amounts of 
unclaimed water in their areas. The false promises and 
history of failed irrigation companies discredited the Carey 
efforts and thus made it more difficult for the state to 
attract investors .
Although Mahon acknowledged that serious problems 
existed on some of the Board's segregations, he reacted 
vehemently to any accusations that the CLAB was not acting 
in "entire good faith" on the projects.®^ A vocal defendant 
of the Carey Act, Mahon extolled the advantages that state- 
sponsored private irrigation could bring to the state. He 
attacked the "present attitude of the Reclamation Service
Tice, CLAB Assistant Secretary, to Henry L. Gray, 
Seattle, 14 October 1940. MHS, RS 32-1-14.
*‘This vicious cycle hurt Carey projects throughout the 
west, even in Idaho, the most successful "Carey state."
There the general rule was that the final cost of a project was usually twice the estimated cost. In addition to the increased cost of construction, often only one-third of the 
acreage originally included in the project could actually be 
irrigated. Williams, p. 80-81. In Montana the problems 
were more acute because the state possessed less of the 
rich, even land found in southern Idaho that made irrigation 
in that area easier and more productive.
®^State Engineer Archibald Mahon to Governor Samuel 
Stewart, 16 October 1913. MHS, RS 32-1-2.
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and the Secretary of the Interior... that private and Carey 
projects are not a success." It was not, Mahon argued, that 
these private companies could not build the projects, it was 
the "heavy over-head charges of the projects that arise from 
the slow settlement of the lands and the resulting heavy 
interest charges against the investment for construction and 
maintenance, without sufficient revenue to support it," that 
caused problems for the private c o m p a n i e s W h e n  in 
competition with the federal projects, private companies, 
which could not offer the delayed and low-interest payments 
of the government enterprises, could not attract as many 
settlers to their lands. Without fairly rapid settlement, 
companies did not receive enough from purchases of water 
rights to make their own payments to investors. Without 
continued support from investors, many companies simply 
could not afford to complete their projects. The Billings, 
Big Timber and Valier projects in Montana all suffered from 
slow settlement due, in part, to competition from federal 
reclamation projects.
In addition to competition from the Reclamation 
Bureau's projects, the Carey districts also lost potential 
settlers to the dry land farming movement that swept through 
the state in the 1910s. Board members blamed advocates of
“State Engineer Archibald Mahon to "38 Individuals and 
Canal Companies," 23 February 1914, Copy. MHS, MC 35-201- 
13 .
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dry land farming for slow sales of Carey land after 1909.'-“ 
After dry land advocates arrived upon the scene, "instead of 
a throng of irrigation farmers coming into our state, as the 
Board expected, the greatest part of the settlers that did 
come took up dry land farmxng."’®
Montana experienced a "flood" of settlers between 1910 
and World War I, but few of the immigrants settled on 
irrigated Carey land. The new farmers were attracted by 
extensions in the Homestead Act, dry land farming 
propaganda, and a cycle of above-average rainfall; they 
settled on land where they could practice the new 
"scientific" form of dry land farming.®* Irrigation 
advocates like Robert Sutherlin of the Rocky Mountain 
Husbandman lamented the attraction that the "Campbell 
Method" of dry land farming had in Montana. To the dismay 
of irrigationists, even the Agricultural Station that had 
been established at Montana State College in Bozeman began
**In an attempt to redeem outstanding ALGC warrants, the
CLAB had raised the price on Carey land from $.50 an acre to
$1.50, but, after brisk land sales in 1908 and 1909 
(primarily in the Billings Bench District), the Board was 
able to attract few settlers onto Carey lands. CLAB
Assistant Secretary George Davies to Governor Samuel V.
Stewart, 12 December 1914. MHS, MC 35-201-13.
"Ibid.
"Roeder, p. 52. Hardy Webster Campbell promoted a system of dry land farming in the 1890s that is named after 
him. This system involved the use of deep plowing, light 
seeding and summer fallowing. Grant, p. 299-300.
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to support the Campbell system/' Everyone seemed to be 
abandoning the old Progressive dream of irrigated farmland 
for the "get-rich-quick" attraction of dry land farming.
According to historian Richard Roeder, the enthusiasm 
for dry land farming in the state was perfectly 
understandable; "the state had between twelve and fifteen 
million acres of non-irrigable land most of which could be 
farmed successfully under the new methods."” Cities like 
Great Falls fully supported the Campbell System because they 
greatly benefitted from it. Settlers filed 1,100 claims at 
the Great Falls land office in the first three weeks of 
October, 1909; the Fort Shaw Federal Reclamation Project, 30 
miles west of Great Falls, when completed, produced just 206 
irrigated farms.” There was a great deal more business for 
Great Falls in dry land farming than in irrigated farmland 
because more people could afford the cheaper dry land, 
especially since they did not have to spend additional money 
to purchase water rights and to pay for canal maintenance.
The dry land farming boom, fueled by good harvests and 
the wartime demands for grain, continued until the droughts 
of 1917 and 1918 and the lower grain prices after the war
’"'Grant, p. 323-335, 365. 
”Roeder, p. 77-78.
’’Grant, p. 3 92, in footnote 61. Grant also noted that 
underfunding of irrigation projects "was a national problem" 
during this period. By 1910, the Sun River Project at Fort 
Shaw was only 7% completed, p. 387-89.
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destroyed many of the dry land farmers.'® Following the 
drought, irrigated farming gained new supporters. The 
drought had several effects on Montanans, according to a 
later report of the State Engineer. People became more 
interested in irrigation again as they realized that 
"irrigation in some form is generally essential to the 
agricultural development of the State." Montanans, the 
report continued, were no longer interested in getting rich 
quickly, but instead wanted to settle and be stable. They 
were "interested in the future of the state" which depended 
largely "upon the proper use and development of our water 
resources... It has largely been these irrigated acres which 
have stabilized our agriculture and helped to carry us along 
during these years of drought and depression."’̂
Obviously a supporter of irrigation, the State Engineer 
exaggerated the influence of irrigation in Montana and the 
attitude change in its people. He correctly noted that much 
of the dry land farms in eastern Montana were abandoned to 
cattle ranching after the drought years. In the northern 
part of the state, however, farmers continued to use dry 
land farming techniques successfully. Irrigation was one 
part of agriculture in Montana, but not the only, or even
’’Grant, p. 378-380. According to Grant's research, 
Montana suffered the highest farm bankruptcy rate in the 
United States in the 1920s. Grant, p. 415-16.
’̂ Fifteenth Biennial Report of the State Engineer, 1931 
32, p. 3. MHS, MC 35-202-2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
most important, component of agricultural success. The 
engineer was probably reacting to the lack of prestige in 
which irrigation had been held during the boom years of dry 
land farming in the 1910s.
Even during the lean years of the 1910s the CLAB 
managed to remain virtually self-sufficient,*^ but in the 
1920s and 1930s, the Board's work slowed down. The CLAB had 
not started a successful Carey project since 1909, and with 
the successful transfers of the Valier and Big Timber 
projects to the water users of those districts in the 1950s, 
the work of the CLAB was almost finished.
Before the Board could end its involvement in the Carey 
districts, however, it had first to ensure that all of the 
districts' lands had been transferred from state ownership, 
either through sales to settlers or relinquishment to the 
federal government. Based on information from Idaho and 
Oregon, the Board decided that, "if any tract of Carey land 
is not reclaimable and subject to irrigation and sold to an 
actual settler, the tracts should be reconveyed to the 
Government.
"All operating expenses of the Board during this period 
derived from land sales and filing fees. The Board made no 
appropriations from the Carey Land Act Fund until 1921 when 
it withdrew money to pay the Board's expenses. State Engineer to State Board of Examiners, 23 June 1923. MHS, RS 
32-1-3.
"Memorandum: Liability of the Carey Land Act Board for
Unsold Tracts of Land. Copy, no date. MHS, RS 32-2-3.
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Additional difficulties arose over the sale of this 
remaining land because it was "marginal." According to the 
Revised Codes of Montana of 1921, the state had to provide 
five acres of water rights for each 40 acres of Carey lands. 
The CLAB could not "sell any of this land unless it [was] to 
be reclaimed by irrigation. When Frank Van Driest wanted 
to purchase some of remaining unclaimed land in the Billings 
District in 1948, he found that he would have to pay $35 per 
acre for water on the land, even though the assistant state 
engineer who examined the area declared that it was "so 
small and inaccessible that I would frankly say that it is 
not feasible to irrigate." The engineer asked the board if 
it could "possibly close one eye and make the sale" without 
the charge for water rights.” As a representative from 
the Billings Bench Water Users Association pointed out, such 
Carey lands that were left on the project were "marginal 
lands in every sense of the word or they would have been 
entered upon years ago...Under these circumstances it seems 
highly ridiculous to go through all the red tape and routine 
which was formerly required under the Carey Act."”
”CLAB to E.E. Tiffany, Secretary of BBWUA, 2 5 August 
1927. MHS, RS 32-2-1.
”Gerald J. Oravetz, Assistant State Engineer, to Buck, 
6 April 1948. MHS, RS 32-2-2.
”E.E. Tiffany, Secretary of BBWUA, to CLAB, 8 April 
1948. MHS, RS 32-2-2.
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Upon examining these marginal Carey lands, State 
Engineer Buck recommended to the Board that they should 
"attempt to get these tracts out of the hands of the Carey 
Land Board into individual hands and be placed on the tax 
rolls." He figured that the state had a total of 1,160 
acres of such land remaining in 11 different tracts.̂ '' The 
General Land Office advised the Board that if "the patented 
lands are unsuitable for irrigation and reclamation, the 
State may reconvey the lands to the United States." After 
the reconveyance, the Bureau of Land Management would 
consider how to dispose of the lands under public land 
laws
Even selling the land to settlers presented problems 
for the Board. By 1943, the Board had sold no Carey land 
for "some years, " so when Louis Dousman wanted to buy land 
in the Billings Bench District, it took the Board almost a 
year to complete the process for the sale, because no one 
knew the procedure.** Once it began actively selling land 
again, the Board managed to sell off some of the remaining 
marginal lands to settlers who owned adjoining tracts. 
Between 1 December 1944 and 3 0 November 1946, the CLAB
’"'State Engineer Fred E. Buck to CLAB, 16 April 1948. 
MHS, RS 32-2-2.
**W.O. Hancock, Chief of Branch of Land Disposal 
Division of Adjudication, Department of Interior, to Albert 
Anderson, Attorney for CLAB, 6 August 1948.
**E.E. Tiffany, Secretary of BBWUA, to State Engineer 
Fred E. Buck, 12 July 1943. MHS, RS 32-2-1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
]Tsc Q ivsd $2,664.88 fir orn 1 and sal ss and o t h©ir payrnsnc s ; i c 
received $3,329, primarily through land sales, for the 
biennium between 1 December 1946 and 30 November 1948.''"
Finally, in the middle of 1957, the CLAB applied to the 
Secretary of the Interior for a quit claim deed to unsold 
Carey lands in the s t a t e . I n  early 1958, State Engineer 
Buck began to return lease checks to settlers, explaining 
that the CLAB had "made application to the U.S. Land 
Management Board to transfer all the tracts of land that are 
being leased to the State Land D e p a r t m e n t I n  1959,
Buck reported to the CLAB members that, "We have only a few 
tag ends left to clean up the operation of the Carey Land 
Act Board. In January of 1959, the Bureau of Land
Management issued to Montana a quit claim deed to the unsold 
Carey lands .
With the relinquishment of these final lands back to 
the U.S. government, and the successful transferal of the
‘““Twenty-Second Biennial Report of the State Engineer 
and of the Carey Land Act Board, 1945-1946. Twenty-Third 
Biennial Report of the State Engineer and of the Carey Land 
Act Board, 1947-1948. MHS, MC 35-202-3.
101/'C.5. Heidel, Deputy State Engineer, to Mrs. Eva 
Junior, Shepherd, 2 December 1959. MHS, MC 32-1-13.
102 t'State Engineer Fred E. Buck to Pete Yegen Jr., 
Billings, 24 February 1958. MHS, RS 32-1-13.
103 ,'State Engineer Fred E. Buck to CLAB members, 9 
January 1959. MHS, RS 32-1-13.
‘“'C. S. Heidel, Deputy State Engineer, to Mrs. Eva 
Junior, Shepherd, 2 December 1959. MHS, MC 32-2-13.
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three projects to the settlers, the Carey Land Act Board 
completed its duties. In its 1963 and 1965 sessions, the 
legislature repealed the legislation creating the Carey Land 
Act Board and the office of the State Engineer. The State 
Water Conservation Board was given many of the State 
Engineer's duties, including that of measuring stream flows 
and negotiating with other states on the allocation of 
streams. The legislature provided that the CLAB and State 
Engineer would transfer their funds and records to the State 
Water Conservation Board.
With very little fanfare (except for the photo 
opportunity provided by the meeting to transfer the Valier 
Project to the settlers in 1953) the Carey Land Act Board 
and the Office of the State Engineer faded out of existence.
'"^State of Montana, Laws and Resolutions of the State 
of Montana passed bv the Thirty-ninth Legislative— Assembly 
in Regular Session, (Helena: State Publishing Co., 1965),
Chapter 280, p. 882-891.
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion
Progressive reformers and western boosters had pictured 
the west as a vast, fertile plain that needed only to have 
water conducted to it to' create a verdant garden. They 
believed, as had Donald Bradford of the Arid Land Grant 
Commission, that there was "no great mystery" attached to 
the process of watering the west. But, there was not enough 
water in the west to satisfy everyone's demands. And even 
where water was plentiful, it was not always easily 
accessible.
Carey projects suffered from the overestimation of 
available water and the underestimation of the amount of 
work needed to put that water onto farmland. John Wesley 
Powell, author of "Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of 
the United States," had informed anyone who would listen in 
the 1890s that there was not enough water to irrigate all 
the land in the west. But, in their desire to create a 
greener, wealthier, more stable region, few wanted to listen 
to the voice of caution. In 1889, Powell had estimated that
87
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up to thirty-five million acres in Montana could be 
reclaimed* through irrigation. But, he cautioned, such an 
©ffott would mean that the state would have to utilize "all 
ics waters--it means that...no drop of water falling within 
the area of the state shall flow beyond the boundaries of 
the state. It means that all the waters falling within the 
state will be utilized upon its lands for agriculture."^ 
Fifteen years later, Montana State Engineer John Wade 
reported that, "after twenty-five years of travel over this 
great State, I am convinced that all our arable lands can be 
irrigated--every arid acre that can be utilized for grain or 
grass can be reclaimed. Unlike Powell, Wade did not 
elaborate on where all the water to irrigate Montana's lands 
would come from; it was just there. Everyone knew that 
there was plenty of water in the west, it only had to be 
captured and channeled to the right areas. Looking at the 
Dearborn River during the period of spring runoff, how could 
one not believe that this one river could irrigate more than 
36,000 acres? But spring runoffs lasted only for weeks or 
days; droughts lasted for years.
Success on Carey projects depended upon how easy it was 
to irrigate land in the district, how much capital a company 
could obtain to build the irrigation system, and how quickly
'John Wesley Powell, Speech before the Montana 
Constitutional Convention of 1889. In Grant, p. 188.
Tirst Biennial Report, 1903-1904, p. 15.
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fanners settled the land. All three of these considerations 
interacted. The easier land was to irrigate, the more 
likely it was to attract investors because they could get a 
faster and surer return on their investments. when 
contractors had enough money to build a solid system, they 
could sell land more readily because farmers were more 
likely to purchase land in a successful district. Once an 
energetic company began work on the Billings Bench project 
and completed some canals and laterals, farmers moved onto 
the district. Of the more than twelve projects contemplated 
by the CLAB and ALGC in Montana, only three were finished. 
Each of these successful districts was located on land close 
to an easily accessible water supply.
Faced with restricted funds and lack of easily 
irrigable land, states did not meet the expectations of the 
Carey Act authors. But, the Carey Land Act was not a 
failure. Although the act never succeeded to its full 
potential--no state ever reclaimed the full one million 
acres offered by the government--it did offer an alternative 
to federal irrigation, and eight western states eventually 
patented over one million acres of government land under the 
act. Idaho and Wyoming took the greatest advantage of the 
act. In all, Idaho patented 617,334 Carey acres and Wyoming 
claimed 203,311 acres. The largest Carey project, the Twin 
Falls South Side Project in Idaho, irrigated 192,750 acres. 
Montana patented the third highest number of Carey acres,
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const rue Ced three irrigation systems under the act that 
provided 92,000 irrigated acres for Montana settlersh
Perhaps Montana could have taken greater advantage of 
the Carey Land Act. If the legislature had been willing to 
guarantee the interest on ALGC bonds, more financiers may 
have been willing to invest in Montana projects. If the 
state had established guidelines for licensing engineers and 
spent more money to gauge stream flows, the Carey boards 
might have had a better reputation for correct estimations 
of the amount of money and time needed to complete projects. 
Montana probably could have built more Carey projects if the 
state had been willing to support the Carey boards more 
fully. But, new laws, such as the Newlands Act, and new 
ideas, like the Campbell Method of dry land farming, 
lessened the state's "need" for irrigated Carey land. If 
state officials could increase the population of Montana and 
the number of farmers without direct state aid, they would 
do so. Overwhelmed by these other movements, the Carey Act 
in Montana gave way to the better-funded projects of the 
Bureau of Reclamation and the popularity of dry land 
farming.
The great social experiment begun with the Carey Land 
Act succeeded in a small part, but failed to achieve the 
sariier Progressive dream of a flowering garden in the 
desert west. Government land grants could provide the
^Dunbar, p. 40-42. Gates, p. 651.
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impetus to reclaim some land, but not much of it. Carey 
projects succeeded where the land was good and companies 
buiId relatively inexpensive systems. Even where 
Carey projects succeeded, however, the settlers on the land 
not the impoverished victims of urban depravity that 
the Progressive reformers had sought to help. Letters of 
inquiry about Carey land in Montana came from Minnesota, 
Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Colorado. Carey settlers were 
people looking for new opportunities, but they were not the 
destitute of the eastern cities. Indeed, project managers 
on Carey districts lamented about problems caused by farmers 
unfamiliar with irrigation techniques--imagine their 
complaints if city dwellers, with no farming experience at 
all, had moved onto these projects. Progressive rhetoric 
aside, Carey Land Act officials wanted hardworking, 
experienced farmers on their districts who could make a 
quick and steady profit from the land, pay off their water 
share purchases as soon as possible, and remain on the land 
to increase the prosperity and stability of the district. 
Nowhere in the Carey Land Act was there any mention of funds 
or programs to move poor people from the eastern cities onto
Carey projects.
Instead of "making homes for the masses," Montana 
officials created a few working projects that are now 
controlled by the water users and whose land is owned by 
family farmers, ranchers and businesses. These projects
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contribute to the financial stability of the surrounding 
regions and provide taxable land for the state. The state 
of Montana, which contributed almost no financing for these 
projects, thus benefitted in a real, albeit small, way from 
the Carey Land Act of 1894.
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APPENDIX I
Progress of States under the Carey Act by 1958
STATE AREA APPLIED FOR*
Oregon....... 791,615
Washington... 155,649,
Arizona...... 31,266
Idaho........ 3, 819,181Nevada....... 185,455
Utah.........  606,704
Colorado  461,707
Montana...... 609,828
New Mexico... 10,204
Wyoming...... 1, 798, 274
Totals...... 8,467,834
*in acres
AREA
SEGREGATED
388,876
13,745.
1,335,76736,808
141,814
284,653
246,698
7.604
1,396,869
3,852,860
AREA
PATENTED
73,442
617,334 1, 578 
37,239 
37,706 
92,280 
4,743 
203,311 
1,067,635
Table 28 in  Lq..the.Annual.R.feRQ„r.t.of.ihaDirector of the Bureau of Land Management. 1958. Reprinted 
in Paul Gates, History of Public Land Law Development. 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968),
p. 651.
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APPENDIX II
Montana Carey Districts
ValierDiscricc
Great Falls
DearbornDistrict
Helena
Big Timber District Billings Bench District
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APPENDIX III
Billings Bench District
@fTHr
5ILLINGS L.VNDaiid IRRIGATION CO*. 
Land* and Canal 
'iT.I l.ONV'STONE COUNTY. MONT/\NA.
Map in First Biennial Report. 1903-1904.
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APPENDIX IV
Valier District
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